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INTRODUCTION 
If a policy’s wisdom rebutted all concerns about its legality, 
American law would be a vastly different domain.  However, the 
Framers’ design places process over policy.  In crafting a 
government in which each branch can “resist encroachments of the 
others,”1 the Framers limited the opportunities for unilateral 
executive action.  When unilateral actions are myopic, structural 
design and sound policy happily coincide.  Conversely, the Framers’ 
architecture of power can elicit frustration when executive action 
appears wise and benevolent, while Congress’s stubborn inaction 
suggests it does not understand the full nature of the problem.  
While these occasions test the Framers’ design, they do not warrant 
discarding the Framers’ structural choices.  The tension between 
President Obama’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and 
Legal Permanent Residents (DAPA) program and the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA) is a case in point.2 
                                                           
 1. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 2. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs, Thomas S. 
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, and R. Gil 
Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 3, 5 (Nov. 20, 2014) 
[hereinafter November 2014 DAPA Memo], available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf (describing the 
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The framework of the INA is clearly inconsistent with the sweeping 
award of benefits DAPA would confer on unlawful entrants into the 
United States.  To determine whether a statute clearly prohibits an 
agency action, a court considers statutory language in its overall 
“context.”3  DAPA would award sought-after immigration benefits, 
including work authorization and a reprieve from removal, to a huge 
cohort of foreign nationals who face substantial barriers under 
current law in acquiring a legal immigration status.4  Potential DAPA 
recipients are currently unlawfully present in the United States, have 
been in this country for five years, and have U.S.-citizen children.5  
While the last two factors might elicit positive discretion if 
immigration officials could write on a blank slate, Congress’s only 
relief for similarly situated foreign nationals entails a far more 
                                                           
policy changes made under the DAPA program).  The Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC) has issued an opinion supporting DAPA’s legality.  The Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec.’s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the U.S. 
& to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 1, 33 (2014) [hereinafter OLC 
Opinion], available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/ 
attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf.  In February 2015, 
Judge Andrew Hanen of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
held that DAPA should have gone through the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
(APA) rulemaking process prior to its announcement.  As a result, Judge Hanen 
entered a nationwide preliminary injunction against DAPA’s implementation.  
Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015), 
appeal filed, No. 15-40238 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2015).  As of April 2, 2015, an appeal of 
Judge Hanen’s order and the government’s request for a stay of the preliminary 
injunction were pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  For a 
defense of DAPA by a prominent immigration scholar and former immigration 
official, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Written Testimony of Stephen H. Legomsky Before 
the S. Comm. On the Judiciary:  Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Loretta 
Lynch as Attorney General of the United States, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
2–3 (Jan. 28–29, 2015), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/01-29-
15%20Legomsky%20Testimony.pdf  [hereinafter Legomsky Testimony] (finding 
support for DAPA in Congress’s actions such as appropriating resources to deport 
only a limited number of noncitizens and providing express authorization to the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to exercise prosecutorial discretion). 
 3. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000); see 
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (noting that statutory 
interpretation must account for both the specific context in which the language is 
used and the broader context of the statute). 
 4. By legal status I mean a statutorily recognized basis for an immigrant or 
nonimmigrant visa that will allow the recipient of the status to enter or remain in the 
United States. 
 5. November 2014 DAPA Memo, supra note 2, at 4. 
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rigorous test.6  The narrow parameters of Congress’s dispensation 
cast doubt on DAPA’s legality:  the INA’s rigorous test would suggest 
that Congress did not authorize immigration officials to readily grant 
more expansive relief.7  Overall, DAPA’s blanket grant of benefits 
clashes with three pillars of the INA:  (1) comprehensive deterrence 
of unlawful entry, presence, and work in the United States; (2) 
enumerated categories of legal status that reflect Congress’s 
longstanding resolve to impede unlawful entrants’ use of post-entry 
U.S.-citizen children for immigration purposes; and (3) strict limits 
on administrative awards of benefits, such as work authorization, 
when those benefits are not ancillary to an enumerated legal status.8 
In announcing DAPA, the government failed to understand that 
the INA is not merely a mechanical guide to allocating immigrant 
and nonimmigrant visas; it is a code of conduct that promotes certain 
outcomes, such as naturalization and refuge from persecution, while 
deterring actions that undermine immigration enforcement.9  
Consider the enumerated categories based on a foreign national’s 
familial relationship with a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident 
(LPR).  For more than sixty years, Congress has imposed an age 
requirement on the ability of U.S. citizens to sponsor a foreign 
                                                           
 6. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2012) (requiring ten years of physical presence in the 
United States and a showing of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a 
U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR)). 
 7. The presumption that express mention of one form of relief in a statute 
excludes other forms is known as expressio unius after the Latin canon, expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius, meaning that inclusion of specific terms implies an intent to 
exclude others.  See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:  
Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 930–33 (2013) (reporting on a survey of congressional 
staffers that indicated staffers were familiar with the canon and used it in legislative 
drafting).  Supporters of DAPA might argue that the relief authorized by the INA is 
distinguishable because it leads to LPR status.  Cf. Legomsky Testimony, supra note 2, 
at 15 (arguing that limits on obtaining LPR status are irrelevant to the provision of 
temporary relief short of legal status).  However, as I explain later in this Article, see 
infra notes 347–48 and accompanying text, DAPA provides recipients with benefits 
such as a substantial reprieve from removal and work authorization that constitute 
the intermediate-term equivalent of LPR status.  Congress’s concern extended not 
just to grants of status but also to any categorical incentives for unlawful entry and 
presence beyond a narrow subset of cases. 
 8. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) (setting a maximum period of 120 days in 
the United States that immigration officials could allow prior to the voluntary 
departure of foreign nationals who lacked any legal basis for remaining). 
 9. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 1 (1996) (noting that the purpose of the statute 
was “to improve deterrence of illegal immigration to the United States . . . by 
reforming exclusion and deportation law and procedures”). 
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national for an immigrant visa.  In requiring that U.S. citizens be at 
least twenty-one years old to sponsor a parent,10 Congress has sought 
to prevent unlawful entrants from obtaining immigration benefits 
linked to a post-entry U.S.-citizen child.  As Senator Sam Ervin of 
North Carolina, who later chaired the Senate Watergate Committee, 
explained in a colloquy with Senator Robert Kennedy of New York 
that influenced the drafting of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
Amendments of 1965 (“1965 Act”), the age requirement was necessary, 
and its omission from an early draft of the 1965 Act would have been 
“unwise.”11  Without the age requirement, Senator Ervin warned, 
“[f]oreigners can come here as visitors and then have a child born here, 
and they would become immediately eligible for admission.”12 
Insertion of the age requirement was a key element in passage of 
the 1965 Act, which established the foundation of current U.S. 
immigration law.13  The 1965 Act abolished national origin quotas that 
had long restricted legal immigration.14  That liberalization, like changes 
in the INA in 1986 and 1996, was part of an ongoing legislative 
dialectic that also strengthened deterrence of unlawful immigration.15 
The INA also reflects Congress’s aim to deter the continued 
presence of foreign nationals who lack any reasonable prospect of 
obtaining a legal immigration status.  Deterrence here includes, inter 
alia, a ten-year bar on the admission of foreign nationals who have 
remained in the United States unlawfully for a year or more.16  
                                                           
 10. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CHRISTINA M. 
RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 251 (5th ed. 2009) 
(explaining the immediate relative category). 
 11. Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Naturalization of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 20 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Judiciary 
Hearings] (statement of Sen. Sam Ervin). 
 12. Id. at 231; see Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part I:  Congressional 
Acquiescence to Deferred Action, 103 GEO. L.J. ONLINE (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript 
at 12 n.68), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2545544 (discussing the 1965 
exchange incorporating this restriction on the age of U.S.-citizen children 
sponsoring their parents). 
 13. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, §  201(b), 
79 Stat. 911, 911 (1965). 
 14. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law:  A New 
Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 279–80 (1996) 
(describing the national origins quota system in place prior to the 1965 legislation). 
 15. S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 12 (1965) (noting that under the 1965 Act, admission 
of immigrants would be “highly selective” and enforcement efforts would prevent 
unlawful migration of inadmissible individuals); id. at 15 (describing additional steps 
required of foreign nationals seeking to work in United States); id. at 18 (imposing 
new restrictions on immigration from other Western Hemisphere countries). 
 16. 8 U.S.C. §  1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2012). 
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Congress intended the ten-year bar as a powerful legislative signal to 
foreign nationals who were unlawfully present not to linger in the 
United States.  Congress has also sought to neutralize the “magnet” of 
U.S. employment,17 which Congress has long viewed as the principal 
cause of unlawful migration.18  As a matter of law and practice, 
immigration officials have accordingly offered work authorization to 
only three discrete groups of foreign nationals:  (1) those with a legal 
status or a reasonable prospect of gaining such status;19 (2) those 
suffering from extraordinary individual hardships;20 or (3) those at 
risk because of exigent events abroad, including increased 
government repression or natural disasters.21  DAPA’s scope far 
exceeds these narrow categories, rendering Congress’s carefully 
crafted limits superfluous. 
                                                           
 17. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 111 (1996). 
 18. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, §  101, 
100 Stat. 3359, 3360 (requiring the imposition of sanctions on employers who hire 
undocumented aliens).  This Article uses the term “undocumented alien” to denote 
a foreign national who has neither legal status nor any other valid official basis for 
remaining in the country. 
 19. Memorandum from Gene McNary, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization 
Serv., to Reg’l Comm’rs (Feb. 2, 1990), reprinted in 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES 164 
(1990) [hereinafter McNary Memo]; see 8 U.S.C. §  1227(d)(1), (2), (4) (providing 
for a stay of removal and acknowledging the availability of deferred action for U and 
T visa applicants, available under the INA for individuals who respectively have been 
victims of crime or assisted in the prosecution of human traffickers). 
 20. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration 
Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 259–60 (2010) (discussing prior immigration 
guidance that provided for favorable exercises of discretion for cases involving 
parents of U.S.-citizen children with serious medical conditions). 
 21. Congress has expressly authorized relief of this kind as a grant of 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS).  See 8 U.S.C. §  1254a(b)(1) (stating the criteria 
for TPS); see also id. §  1254a(g) (stating that TPS is the “exclusive authority” 
delegated by Congress to immigration officials to “to permit aliens who are . . . 
deportable . . . to remain in the United States temporarily because of their 
particular nationality or region of foreign state of nationality”).  President George 
H.W. Bush issued a signing statement regarding the Immigration Act of 1990 that 
claimed that the Executive Branch might have independent constitutional 
authority to act to protect foreign nationals in the United States from harm they 
would encounter if they returned to their country of origin, even if those foreign 
nations did not meet the criteria for TPS.  See George H.W. Bush, Former 
President of the United States, Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990 
(Nov. 29, 1990), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19117 
(interpreting the TPS provision as not detracting any authority from the Executive 
Branch to exercise prosecutorial discretion in certain immigration cases). 
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While immigration officials have some discretion, Congress has 
tailored that discretion to fit the INA’s deterrence objectives.22  Any 
exercise of discretion that is favorable to those who have violated the 
law triggers the problem of moral hazard:  individuals who know in 
advance they will be immunized from the consequences of 
wrongdoing have a heightened incentive to break the law.23  Moral 
hazard undermines the deterrent purposes of any framework of rules.  
Congress has expressed concern that unchecked discretion in 
immigration law can produce moral hazard.24  As a result, Congress 
has markedly reduced that discretion in several key areas of 
immigration law.  For example, in the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Congress sharply 
limited the award of extended voluntary departure (EVD) to 
preclude protracted stays in the United States by foreign nationals 
who had been placed in removal proceedings.25  DAPA circumvents 
these congressional curbs. 
In assessing the quantum of discretion delegated by Congress in 
light of moral hazard, we should distinguish between enforcement 
priorities in individual cases and affirmative benefits that flow to entire 
categories of unlawful immigrants.  Congress has empowered 
                                                           
 22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (limiting parole or admission into the United 
States of individuals without a visa to “case-by-case” decisions based on “urgent 
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit”); see also id. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) 
(limiting grants of voluntary departure). 
 23. Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow first explained the concept of moral 
hazard.  See Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 
AM. ECON. REV. 941, 961 (1963) (noting that in the provision of health care, the 
availability of reimbursement for care diminishes a consumer’s incentive to seek the 
most cost-effective provider); Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 237, 270 (1996) (discussing the phenomenon as exacerbated by insurance in 
that individuals with insurance will take less care and incur more loss, even if they 
will not experience such loss themselves); Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and 
Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541, 541–42 (1979) (discussing the workings of the moral 
hazard model in the context of insurance); cf. Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard:  
Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives’ Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts, 7 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 55, 79–80 (2006) (discussing the phenomenon in corporate 
compensation policies regarding reimbursement of defense costs). 
 24. See 142 CONG. REC. 9773 (1996) (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson) 
(commenting during legislative debate as a leading sponsor of immigration 
legislation, and issuing a warning about “people gimmicking the system” to stay in 
the United States without a pathway to a legal status through officials’ unchecked 
awards of extended voluntary departure (EVD)). 
 25. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) (curtailing EVD from no time limit to a 
voluntary departure of 120 days from the foreign national’s agreement to depart 
the United States). 
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immigration officials to set priorities for enforcement in a system 
characterized by limited resources.26  In exercising discretion 
regarding priorities, immigration officials may elect to forego or 
terminate removal proceedings in certain cases.  This is the largely 
tacit discretion that the Supreme Court has acknowledged, most 
recently in Arizona v. United States.27  In contrast, benefits are express, 
not merely tacit, advantages for which individuals apply in advance.  
If an application is successful, the recipient can reasonably assume 
that the benefit will last for a definite period of time.  In immigration 
law, such affirmative benefits include deferred action, which provides 
a reprieve from removal for a fixed period and work authorization for 
that period.  Moral hazard is more readily manageable with priority-
setting than it is with the award of benefits, particularly when those 
benefits are available to large categories of people. 
The example of criminal law illustrates why moral hazard is a 
greater risk in the categorical award of benefits.  Prosecutors 
routinely set priorities that result in devoting fewer resources to 
certain crimes, compared with others.  For example, prosecutors may 
devote greater resources to arrest and prosecute murderers than they 
do for burglars.  As a result, some burglars may well escape 
prosecution.28  However, burglars or other individuals who have 
committed wrongs outside prosecutorial priorities generally cannot 
apply in advance for prosecutorial forbearance or rely on that 
forbearance as they persist in wrongdoing.29  Prosecutors view the 
moral hazard problem with enforcement priorities as manageable 
because of information asymmetries between law enforcement 
officials and the universe of potential wrongdoers.  Prospective 
wrongdoers in the broader community may not know enough about 
                                                           
 26. See id. § 1103(a)(3) (empowering the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
“establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other 
papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary 
for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this [Act]” (emphasis added)). 
 27. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (noting that, as an initial matter, federal 
immigration officials must first decide if it makes sense to pursue removal at all in 
specific cases). 
 28. Of course, some murderers also escape prosecution.  My only point here is 
that prosecutors strive to hold murderers accountable and devote greater resources 
to the effort. 
 29. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem 
of Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1281–85 (1999) (discussing the 
premises of the criminal model as compared with the administrative regulation model). 
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law enforcement officials’ internal priorities to game the system.30  
The provision of benefits, in contrast, ratchets up moral hazard.  The 
news of benefits travels quickly and more people want to “join the 
party” when officials concretely reward wrongdoing instead of merely 
tolerating it.31  A categorical award of benefits can therefore 
incentivize wrongdoing on a mass scale. 
In immigration law, making the categorical award of benefits, like 
work authorization, ancillary to an application for legal status 
manages moral hazard.  Discretion in this context serves the overall 
immigration framework and does not clash with the INA’s goal of 
deterrence.  As an example, consider how the administrations of 
Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush collaborated with 
leading members of Congress on a “Family Fairness” program that 
granted deferred action to the spouses and children of persons 
legalized under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 198632 
(“IRCA”).  Since an IRCA beneficiary could become an LPR and, in 
due course, a U.S. citizen, each beneficiary’s spouse and children 
were already likely to obtain a legal status within a reasonable time.33  
Family Fairness merely resolved a timing problem that would 
otherwise have put those close relatives at risk for removal while they 
                                                           
 30. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules:  On Acoustic Separation 
in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 634–35 (1984) (noting that the law sometimes 
balances ex ante deterrence and ex post compassion by sending different messages 
to lay and elite audiences:  the law sends a uniform message to the public about 
compliance with rules but then, in a manner hidden from public view, may send a 
more complex message to officials such as sentencing judges about the importance 
of tempering deterrence with compassion); John M. Darley et al., The Ex Ante 
Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 165, 181 (2001) (analyzing a study 
showing that many people were not familiar with laws on the books, and therefore, 
by extension, knew little about enforcement priorities).  Sometimes information 
asymmetries erode over time; repeat players among lawbreakers may share 
information about their experiences with law enforcement priorities, shaping 
prospective lawbreakers’ expectations about the probability of prosecution.  The 
distinction between priorities and benefits is a rough heuristic that blurs at the 
margins, like most distinctions in law or fact. 
 31. See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161–62 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) 
(per curiam) (requiring heightened agency response to complaints of discrimination 
in education after upholding the district court’s injunction and noting that 
providing federal funding to wrongdoers undermined antidiscrimination norms). 
 32. Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394; see McNary Memo, supra note 
19, at 1 (clarifying the policy surrounding eligibility for voluntary departure to 
ensure uniformity for those who qualify). 
 33. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (2012) (allocating preferences for family-sponsored 
immigrants to spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of LPRs). 
MARGULIES (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2015  1:56 PM 
1192 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1183 
waited.34  In contrast, DAPA provides benefits to unlawful immigrants 
who have no reasonable prospect of obtaining a legal status under 
the INA.  It thus presents moral hazard problems that Congress has 
persistently sought to avoid. 
As is always the case, Congress may be wrong about the policies it 
has written into the INA.  Indeed, compelling policy reasons support 
a legislative program of immigration reform that would grant legal 
status to all those to benefit from DAPA, and more.35  However, as the 
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) admits in its 
opinion supporting DAPA, the program stands or falls not on its 
policy wisdom, but on its fealty to Congress’s dictates.36  That is where 
DAPA falls short. 
Administrative law principles allow courts to push for greater 
deliberation by immigration officials.  As a binding norm that 
substantially affects the interests of millions, DAPA should have 
undergone the rigors of the rulemaking process set out in the APA.  
Furthermore, as a “general enforcement policy,”37 DAPA fits within 
the presumption that agency action is reviewable.38  Limits on judicial 
                                                           
 34. For more detail on the Family Fairness program, see infra notes 187–88 and 
accompanying text.  Defenders of DAPA’s legality analogize it to the Family Fairness 
program.  See OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 14, 30 n.15 (referencing the Family 
Fairness program, which granted extended voluntary departure and work 
authorization to an estimated 1.5 million spouses and children of noncitizens); see 
also Mark Noferi, When Reagan and GHW Bush Took Bold Executive Action on 
Immigration, HILL (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/foreign-policy/219463-when-reagan-and-ghw-bush-took-bold-executive-action-on 
(stating that, similar to President Obama’s action, the Family Fairness program was 
estimated to assist over forty percent of the undocumented population at that time).  
However, because Family Fairness provided benefits that were merely a bridge to an 
application for legal status, it is not an apt precedent for DAPA. 
 35. See November 2014 DAPA Memo, supra note 2, at 1, 3 (highlighting certain 
policy reasons for implementing DAPA, including the limited resources available for 
immigration enforcement and the need to prioritize those who present public safety 
or national security concerns). 
 36. See OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 31 (asserting that DAPA is “consistent with 
congressional policy”). 
 37. See Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676–77 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (providing that general enforcement policies may be reviewable for legal 
sufficiency because they may present the special risk that the agency is abdicating its 
statutory responsibilities). 
 38. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1967) (emphasizing that 
the presumption of judicial review of agency action is so important that it is only 
overcome if a showing of clear and convincing evidence of contrary legislative intent 
can be made). 
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review of individual enforcement decisions39 do not apply to review of 
general policies.  Consistency of a general enforcement policy with 
the statutory framework supplies a workable standard for assessing 
agency action.40  Judicial review is particularly valuable because a 
sweeping non-enforcement policy decision like DAPA may constitute 
an agency’s “abdication” of its role.41  This risk is particularly severe 
for policies such as DAPA, which involve the categorical grant of 
benefits to unlawful entrants.  Indeed, the wholesale conferral of 
benefits may shift DAPA from the domain of agency inaction to the 
realm of agency action, which is presumptively reviewable.42  
Conferring benefits such as work authorization on large groups who 
have violated immigration law exacerbates the problem of moral 
hazard that Congress has sought to address.  Judicial review 
diminishes this risk, restoring the balance that Congress sought. 
Upon review, administrative law principles demonstrate that DAPA 
is unworthy of judicial deference.  The Supreme Court’s Chevron 
doctrine establishes that courts should defer to agency decisions only 
if:  (1) the statute is ambiguous, and (2) the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable.43  The agency fails at Chevron’s step one if the statute 
clearly precludes the agency’s reading.  To assess ambiguity, a court 
interprets “the words of a statute . . . in their context and with a view 
to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”44  In judging the scope 
of delegation to an agency, the touchstone should be “common 
sense.”45  The Supreme Court has required a close fit between the 
scale of an agency action’s effects and the specificity of the statutory 
authorization.46  Just as Congress does not “hide elephants in 
mouseholes,”47 it does not customarily authorize the use of “vague 
terms” to decree “fundamental” changes in a regulatory framework.48  
                                                           
 39. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not 
to prosecute or enforce . . . is a decision generally committed to the agency’s 
absolute discretion.”). 
 40. Id. at 830. 
 41. Crowley, 37 F.3d at 677 (citing Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4). 
 42. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140–41. 
 43. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–43 (1984). 
 44. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) 
(quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 48. Id. 
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To fit the dictates of “common sense,” a change of enormous legal 
and “political magnitude”49 wrought by an agency would have to be 
authorized by specific statutory language. 
The fundamental legal and “common sense” problem with DAPA is 
its shunning of any intelligible limiting principle that situates 
executive discretion within the INA’s comprehensive framework.  
The carefully wrought provisions of the INA clash with DAPA’s 
blanket grant of immigration benefits.  Awarding work authorization 
and a reprieve from removal to millions of foreign nationals 
undermines Congress’s deterrence goals.  While DAPA happens to 
constitute a sound policy choice because of the human cost of the 
status quo for the United States’s undocumented population,50 few 
measures could so clearly clash with Congress’s intent.  That intent, 
not the wisdom of the policy, should be controlling. 
This Article is in five Parts.  Part I discusses the text and context of 
the INA, centering on its three-pronged approach to deterrence.  
Part II discusses the history of executive discretion in immigration 
and Congress’s effort in the last twenty years to limit discretion in the 
award of immigration benefits.  Part III argues that DAPA is a 
legislative rule requiring notice-and-comment procedures under the 
APA.  This Part also argues that DAPA is reviewable as a “statement of 
general enforcement policy,”51 and that judicial review will further 
the INA’s aims without disrupting its implementation.  Part IV argues 
that DAPA should not receive deference under the Chevron doctrine 
because the INA unambiguously precludes a discretionary award of 
benefits of DAPA’s size and scope.  Part V concludes that DAPA also fails 
the separation of powers test outlined by Justice Jackson in Youngstown. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF DETERRENCE IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
The INA is a comprehensive framework that authorizes specific 
categories of lawful immigration and deters unlawful migration to the 
United States.  As the Judiciary Committee stated in its report on the 
foundational 1965 Immigration Act, which abolished the rigid 
national quota system that had long restricted legal immigration, this 
                                                           
 49. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133. 
 50. For discussion of one aspect of this human tragedy, see Michael A. Olivas, 
Dreams Deferred:  Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Vexing Case(s) of DREAM 
Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463, 463–65 (2012) (detailing the efforts to 
push legislation at the state and federal level to allow undocumented college 
students to access financial aid). 
 51. Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985)). 
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balance of invitation and deterrence was premised on enumerated, 
“highly selective” criteria for admission52 and clear penalties for 
noncompliance.  Preserving that balance is central to a stable U.S. 
immigration policy, which has produced the highest levels of legal 
immigration in the world since the passage of the 1965 Act.53 
A. The INA and Enumerated Forms of Legal Status 
As a comprehensive framework, the INA’s method recalls the 
approach taken in the Constitution itself:  just as the Constitution 
hinges on enumerated powers, the INA relies on enumerated 
categories of legal status for migrants.54  For example, the INA 
specifies that immigrants to the United States fit into certain clearly 
demarcated categories such as “immediate relatives” of U.S. 
citizens—who can enter the United States without numerical 
restriction55—and other family-based categories such as unmarried 
sons or daughters of citizens, married sons or daughters of citizens, 
and siblings of citizens—who are subject to yearly caps on migration 
and must therefore wait their turn.56  Subject to similar caps, LPRs 
can petition for spouses, minor children, and adult children but not 
parents or siblings.57  Individuals who are currently LPRs cannot 
sponsor parents or siblings for immigrant visas.58  To sponsor a 
parent or sibling, a current LPR must become a U.S. citizen.59  As 
Congress has long made clear, this carefully calibrated hierarchy is 
based on the relative urgency of reunification and the importance of 
other policy goals, such as encouraging LPRs to naturalize and 
deterring unlawful migration. 
                                                           
 52. S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 12 (1965). 
 53. See Adam Ozimek, Is the U.S. the Most Immigrant Friendly Country in the World?, 
FORBES (Nov. 18, 2012, 8:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/ 
2012/11/18/is-the-u-s-the-most-immigrant-friendly-country-in-the-world (referencing 
data that demonstrates that the United States ranks highest in the world for the 
number of immigrants moving to the country each year). 
 54. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 13 (1982) (quoting Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 
647, 664 (1978)) (describing the INA as a “‘comprehensive and complete code 
covering all aspects of admission of aliens to this country’”). 
 55. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2012). 
 56. Id. § 1153(a)(1), (3)–(4). 
 57. Id. § 1153(a)(2). 
 58. Id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); id. § 1153(a) (establishing remaining categories of 
family-based visas, barring LPRs from bringing in parents or siblings and noting that 
LPRs must first become U.S. citizens to do so). 
 59. Id. § 1153(a). 
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In the domain of family relationships, Congress in the last twenty-
five years has greatly expanded relief for foreign nationals who have 
suffered abuse as the spouses of U.S. citizens and LPRs, allowing the 
survivors of such abuse to obtain a legal status independent of their 
abusers.60  Moreover, in a limited category of cases, Congress has 
provided relief to otherwise unlawful immigrants who can 
demonstrate that they have been here for ten years and that their 
removal would impose “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” 
on a U.S. citizen, typically a minor child.61  In addition to family-based 
immigration, Congress has also provided nonimmigrant visas for 
students and tourists, immigrant and nonimmigrant visas for skilled 
workers, and visas for a closely regulated and specified array of other 
individuals, including refugees and victims of crime.62  In addition, in 
1986, Congress agreed to legalize the status of millions of unlawful 
immigrants.63  In 1990, in collaboration with immigration officials, 
Congress also ensured that close relatives of 1986 legalization 
recipients would be allowed to remain in the United States until 
those relatives had an opportunity to acquire a legal status themselves 
based on the family relationships designated for legal status in the 
INA.64  Congress made clear that any further comprehensive 
legalization was a task for Congress,65 not a sphere where the 
Executive Branch could act unilaterally. 
These enumerated categories largely exhaust the domain of legal 
immigration.  There are no residual categories of legal immigration 
status beyond those enumerated in the statute.  Foreign nationals 
who fall outside the enumerated categories are removable unless they 
qualify for narrowly circumscribed forms of relief.66  That state of 
                                                           
 60. See, e.g., Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-386, § 1504, 114 Stat. 1464, 1522–23 (improving access to cancellation of 
removal for immigrant victims of spousal abuse); Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40701, 108 Stat. 1796, 1953 
(creating an option for immigrant victims of spousal abuse to self-petition for 
permanent residency). 
 61. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). 
 62. See, e.g., id. § 1101(a)(15)(B), (F), (U) (defining nonimmigrant visa options 
for tourists, students, and crime victims, respectively). 
 63. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201, 100 
Stat. 3359, 3394 (providing a path to lawful residency for immigrants with unlawful 
status who entered the United States before 1982). 
 64. McNary Memo, supra note 19, at 1. 
 65. S. REP. NO. 99-132, at 16 (1985) (describing the 1986 legalization as a “‘one-
time only’ program”). 
 66. See infra notes 136–38 and accompanying text (describing limited forms of 
relief short of legal status). 
MARGULIES (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2015  1:56 PM 
2015] THE BOUNDARIES OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION 1197 
affairs does not necessarily connote harshness.  It is simply the legislative 
price for the enumerated forms of legal status that the INA provides. 
In addition to enabling legal immigration, the INA deters unlawful 
entry into the United States and unlawful presence by foreign 
nationals.  Indeed, deterrence of unlawful migration is also a crucial 
factor in the crafting of enumerated forms of legal status.  Deterrence 
results from an intricate latticework of definitions, penalties, and 
statutory bars.  The law seeks to deter a range of conduct that drives 
foreign nationals to unlawfully enter the country and remain 
unlawfully present in the United States.67  However, Congress’s 
framework couples ex ante deterrence with a finely calibrated degree 
of ex post equitable adjustment.  This framework provides relief for 
people who have a pathway to legal status, including victims of 
human trafficking.68  Congress has also arguably acquiesced in relief 
for a smaller group of people presenting extreme hardship cases, 
including those who are very young, very old, infirm,69 or at risk 
because of sudden dangers abroad such as government repression or 
the effects of natural disasters.70  Such discretionary benefits are 
designed to be modest to prevent the exception from overwhelming 
the rule.  DAPA undermines that balance. 
B. Deterrence Under the INA:  A Three-Legged Stool 
To discourage unlawful immigration, Congress has inserted 
provisions into the INA that form a three-legged stool.  First, a long-
standing provision of the INA impedes unlawful entrants who seek to 
gain a legal status through post-entry U.S.-citizen children.71  Second, 
the INA deters unlawful entrants from remaining in the United 
                                                           
 67. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) (barring re-entry for three years for 
noncitizens unlawfully present for less than one year but more than 180 days, and for 
ten years for noncitizens unlawfully present for more than one year). 
 68. See id. § 1227(d)(1) (providing for stays of removal for certain applicants for 
U and T visas, which are available to victims of crime and human trafficking, respectively). 
 69. See Wadhia, supra note 20, at 259–60; Leon Wildes, The Deferred Action Program 
of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services:  A Possible Remedy for Impossible 
Immigration Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819, 830–31 (2004) (listing the number of 
cases where each age-related factor was determinative). 
 70. See OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 16 (describing deferred action granted to 
foreign students in New Orleans who, because of Hurricane Katrina, were 
temporarily unable to fulfill the terms of their student visas). 
 71. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A) (stating that U.S.-citizen children can only 
petition their foreign-born parent when the child turns twenty-one). 
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States.72  Third, the INA seeks to neutralize the “magnet” of U.S. jobs 
for unlawful entrants.73 
DAPA knocks over that three-legged stool.  Potential DAPA 
recipients are by definition currently unlawfully present in the United 
States, have been in this country for five years, and have U.S.-citizen 
children.74  Instead of signaling that such acts undermine the INA’s 
carefully crafted framework, DAPA rewards recipients with deferred 
action, a form of relief that translates into the receipt of work 
authorization and a reprieve from removal.75  Moreover, DAPA’s scale 
is vast, potentially including forty percent of the United States’ 
undocumented population.76  In this sense, DAPA is a far broader 
program than Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), an 
earlier initiative that provided deferred action to foreign nationals 
below a certain age who came to the United States as children with 
their parents.77  While DACA seemed inconsistent with the INA in 
                                                           
 72. See id. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (noting that “unlawfully present” noncitizens will be 
inadmissible for a term of three or ten years depending on the length of their 
unlawful presence in the United States). 
 73. See id. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 108, 111 (1996) (detailing how the INA will 
establish programs to verify work eligibility as a means of deterring employers from 
hiring noncitizens). 
 74. November 2014 DAPA Memo, supra note 2, at 4. 
 75. Id. at 4–5. 
 76. Press Release, Migration Policy Inst., MPI:  As Many as 3.7 Million Unauthorized 
Immigrants Could Get Relief from Deportation under Anticipated New Deferred 
Action Program (Nov. 19, 2014), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
news/mpi-many-37-million-unauthorized-immigrants-could-get-relief-deportation-
under-anticipated-new (estimating that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) and DAPA programs combined will benefit more than 5.2 million people, 
nearly half of the estimated 11.4 million undocumented immigrants). 
 77. See Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law:  Presidential Stewardship, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105, 107–08 (2014) 
(arguing that DACA was an appropriate exercise of presidential power to protect 
“intending Americans” from hostile non-federal sovereigns, such as individual states 
like Arizona that had enacted restrictive immigration laws).  I recognized in that 
Article that DACA’s legal underpinnings would be weakened by the success of legal 
attacks on restrictive state laws.  See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 
(2012) (holding that the INA preempted portions of Arizona’s restrictive 
immigration law); see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the 
Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 496 (2012) (discussing the unique 
position of states in the federal immigration scheme); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. 
Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism:  A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 
2077–78 (2013) (refuting arguments used by anti-immigrant legislation supporters to 
justify strict state-level immigration policies, such as the federal government’s 
inaction in the realm of immigration and critical necessity due to high levels of 
illegal immigration to certain states); Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. 
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certain respects, DAPA’s breadth poses a much more severe 
challenge to Congress’s framework. 
1. Deterring unlawful entrants from gaining legal status through post-entry 
U.S.-citizen children 
For decades, Congress has been alert to the risk posed by unlawful 
entrants gaining a legal status through post-entry U.S.-citizen 
children.  The INA expressly warns unlawful entrants against relying 
on post-entry U.S.-citizen children to gain a legal status by erecting 
formidable barriers against attempts to game the U.S. immigration 
system.  Indeed, the INA permits such attempts only in cases 
involving “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” and ten 
years of physical presence in the United States,78 not the five years 
that DAPA stipulates.  Although DAPA does not grant recipients a 
legal status, it provides substantial benefits like a reprieve from 
removal and work authorization that undercut the INA’s clear message. 
The INA’s restrictions on unlawful entrants relying on post-entry 
U.S.-citizen children go back more than sixty years.  The McCarran-
Walter Act of 195179 provided that a foreign national was eligible for 
admission for lawful permanent residence based on parentage of a 
U.S. citizen only if the sponsoring citizen was at least twenty-one years 
old.80  The landmark 1965 Act, which abolished the national quota 
                                                           
DAVIS L. REV. 535, 539–40 (2012) (arguing that states’ attempts to create strict 
immigration policy via “mirror-image” laws interfere with federal power); Catherine 
Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers and the President’s Power to Preempt, 90 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 691, 728–30 (2014) (arguing that federal administrative action on 
immigration should have a preemptive effect on state laws); Hiroshi Motomura, 
Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1361, 1365–68 (1999) (discussing immigration federalism and the expanding 
role of states in immigration-related legislation, beginning with Proposition 187 in 
California that attempted to bar undocumented noncitizens from accessing a wide 
range of public services); cf. David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. 
REV. 1125, 1148 (2012) (criticizing the preemption arguments as circular).  Today, 
legal challenges have blunted those state laws and DACA’s continued legality is 
questionable, although the President might have the power to “wind up” the 
program at his own pace.  See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 163–64, 173 (1948) 
(holding that the President had full discretionary power over the removal of “enemy 
aliens” and that the power was not judicially reviewable). 
 78. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012). 
 79. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). 
 80. Id. § 203(a)(2). 
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system that had curbed legal immigration for decades, continued 
these restrictions.81 
The abolition of the national quota system was a watershed event, 
but it only occurred because its sponsors and supporters signaled that 
they were committed to a “highly selective system for the admission of 
immigrants,” not to open borders.82  In its report on the bill that 
became the 1965 Act, the Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged 
that “there are far more people who would like to come to the United 
States than the United States can accept.”83  Consistent with this 
understanding of the need for immigration controls, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee report specified that the “parents of adult U.S. 
citizens . . . may enter the United States without numerical limitation.”84 
Exchanges between Senator Robert M. Kennedy, Democrat of New 
York (and former Attorney General) and Senator Sam Ervin, 
Democrat of North Carolina (who later chaired the Senate Watergate 
Committee) reveal the importance of these restrictions to the 
legislative bargain embodied in the 1965 Act.  Senator Ervin 
articulated the concern that drove this provision at a pivotal hearing 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee.85  Commenting on an early 
version of the legislation that provided for the admission of a parent 
of any U.S. citizen, regardless of the citizen’s age, Senator Ervin 
cautioned his colleagues about the unintended consequences of this 
departure from current law.  Relying on this provision, Senator Ervin 
warned that “[f]oreigners can come here as visitors and then have a 
child born here, and they would become immediately eligible for 
admission  . . . .”86  Such a change from previous law would be 
“unwise,” Senator Ervin cautioned,87 because it would encourage 
foreign nationals who entered on temporary visas (or, presumably, 
without any visa at all) to use post-entry U.S.-citizen children to gain 
immigration benefits. 
Responding to Senator Ervin, Senator Kennedy readily agreed, 
saying of Ervin’s warning, “That is right.  I think [the provision 
allowing citizens to petition for parents] should go back as it was.”88  
                                                           
 81. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 201(b), 
79 Stat. 911, 911 (1965). 
 82. S. REP. NO. 89-748, at 12 (1965). 
 83. Id. at 14. 
 84. Id. at 13. 
 85. See 1965 Senate Judiciary Hearings, supra note 11, at 230–31, 270. 
 86. Id. at 231. 
 87. Id. at 230–31. 
 88. Id. at 231. 
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Kennedy ascribed the change to a “technical mistake in the 
drafting.”89  Shortly thereafter, Assistant Attorney General Norbert 
Schlei testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee, echoing 
Senator Kennedy’s view that the change was a mere drafting “error”90 
and proposing the language in the statute today, requiring a U.S. 
citizen to be “at least 21 years of age” to sponsor parents.91  Schlei 
affirmed Kennedy and Ervin’s understanding of the policy behind 
this language, explaining that it was necessary “to preclude an 
inadvertent grant of . . . immigrant status to aliens to whom a child is 
born while in the United States on a tourist visa.”92  Senators Kennedy 
and Ervin would have been puzzled at DAPA’s award of immigration 
benefits like work authorization to foreign nationals who engaged in 
precisely the conduct that the age requirement for citizen sponsors 
was designed to prevent. 
2. Deterring unlawful presence 
The second leg of the deterrence stool—discouraging unlawful 
presence in the United States—is just as sturdy.  In IIRIRA, Congress 
augmented deterrence of foreign nationals’ lingering in the United 
States without a legal status.93  IIRIRA imposed bars on reentry for 
foreign nationals who remained in the United States unlawfully.  
Individuals who left the United States after having been unlawfully 
present between 180 days and one year were subject to a three-year 
bar on admission to the United States.94  Congress sent an even 
starker message to foreign nationals who left the United States after 
having been unlawfully present for one year or more:  they were 
subject to a ten-year bar.95 
As the House Judiciary Committee report put it, foreign nationals 
who remained in the United States without a lawful status eroded the 
                                                           
 89. Id. at 230. 
 90. Id. at 270. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
 94. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (2012). 
 95. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II); see Zoe Lofgren, A Decade of Radical Change in 
Immigration Law:  An Inside Perspective, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349, 361 (2005) 
(explaining that an immigrant who departs the country after one year of 
unauthorized stay is barred from receiving any immigration benefits for ten years). 
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foundations of immigration law and national sovereignty.96  A chief 
goal of immigration law, the House report asserted, was the prompt 
processing of persons entitled to lawful status, and the “prompt 
exclusion or removal of those who are not so entitled.”97  The House 
report identified individuals who came to the United States on a 
temporary visa (as students or tourists) and overstayed as a prime 
source of the problem.98  The context of the House discussion makes 
it clear that foreign nationals who entered without inspection and 
then remained unlawfully were also targets of heightened 
enforcement.99  Congress imposed the unlawful presence bars to 
deter foreign nationals from both entering the United States and 
remaining here without a lawful status. 
Related INA provisions highlight Congress’s efforts to deter foreign 
nationals from remaining in the United States without a lawful status, 
even when those individuals had post-entry U.S.-citizen children.  
Under the INA, a foreign national who has entered the United States 
without being inspected, admitted, or paroled cannot “adjust” to the 
coveted LPR status.100  As a practical matter, this means that a foreign 
national who entered the United States without inspection (like a 
substantial percentage of prospective DAPA beneficiaries) has no 
chance to acquire any lawful status unless that person first leaves the 
United States and applies for a visa at a U.S. consulate abroad.  Then, 
Congress’s trap is sprung:  once that person leaves, he or she is 
subject to the three- and ten-year bars discussed above.  In other 
words, the foreign national who enters without inspection faces 
substantial obstacles to obtaining a legal status—obstacles that 
Congress deliberately placed in the path of persons who violated the 
immigration laws.101 
                                                           
 96. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 110 (1996) (recommending a “fundamental re-
orientation of immigration policy” that would create an immigration system that 
serves the national interest, but also serves economic and humanitarian needs). 
 97. Id. at 111. 
 98. Id. at 114–16. 
 99. Id. at 116. 
 100. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 
 101. The Supreme Court has recently observed that even legal immigration often 
“takes time.”  Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2199 (2014).  Congress 
has drafted the INA to place far more daunting obstacles in the path of unlawful 
entrants whose only prospect for legal status stems from a post-entry U.S.-citizen 
child.  In individual cases involving hardship, immigration officials could grant 
“advance parole” to an unlawful entrant who would have to leave the United States 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) to adjust to LPR status and then would be faced 
with a ten-year bar on readmission.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).  In a case involving a 
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While there is a waiver available for the unlawful presence bars, the 
narrow scope of the waiver demonstrates that Congress rejected 
precisely the relief that DAPA seeks to provide.  The waiver is only 
available to an immigrant who is the “spouse or son or daughter” of a 
U.S. citizen or LPR.102  Parents of U.S. citizens and LPRs are not 
eligible.103  Indeed, Congress changed the text of IIRIRA to 
harmonize it with the INA’s efforts to deter unlawful entrant parents 
of post-entry U.S.-citizen children from using their children to 
acquire a legal status.  An early House version of the bill that 
eventually became IIRIRA had included parents of U.S. citizens and 
LPRs as persons eligible for the unlawful presence waiver.104  
However, the Conference Report and the statute itself changed the 
waiver’s scope, rendering parents of U.S.-citizen or LPR children 
ineligible unless they had another qualifying relative such as a U.S.-
citizen or LPR “spouse or parent.”105  The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) recently affirmed that interpretation.106  Courts have 
regarded this kind of evidence as definitive proof that Congress 
disapproved of the remedy that it deleted.107 
                                                           
foreign national who returned to his country of origin under a grant of advance 
parole to care for aged parents, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that 
the foreign national’s trip did not constitute a “departure” from the United States 
that rendered him subject to the ten-year bar.  See Matter of Arrabally, 25 I. & N. 
Dec. 771, 775–80 (2012).  However, because Congress has restricted parole to case-
by-case relief, immigration officials could not use advance parole in a categorical 
way to shield the approximately four million potential DAPA beneficiaries from the 
ten-year bar.  See infra notes 154–56 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s 
restrictions on parole). 
 102. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). 
 103. The applicant for the waiver must also show that the refusal of admission to 
the applicant would result in “extreme hardship” to the citizen or LPR “spouse or 
parent” of the immigrant.  Id. 
 104. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 226–27 (1996) (asserting that the ground for 
inadmissibility may be waived if refusal of admission would create extreme hardship 
to the lawfully resident spouse or parent). 
 105. H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 207–08 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 106. See Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility for Certain 
Immediate Relatives, 78 Fed. Reg. 535, 543 (Jan. 3, 2013) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. 
212) (noting that the “statute only permits a showing of extreme hardship to a 
spouse or parent as a basis for granting the waiver”). 
 107. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952) 
(holding that President Truman’s seizure of steel mills was not authorized by statute 
and observing that “Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized 
such governmental seizures in cases of emergency”). 
MARGULIES (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2015  1:56 PM 
1204 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1183 
3. Eliminating unlawful entrants’ U.S. employment 
Congress’s treatment of unlawful immigrants’ work in the United 
States reflects the same attention to the deterrence goals of the INA.  
Congress has consistently acknowledged that the chance to work in 
the United States was a “driving force” behind unlawful 
immigration.108  IRCA authorized legalization for well over one 
million undocumented individuals, but did so only as part of a 
compromise that imposed sanctions on employers who hired 
undocumented workers.109  In legislative history, IRCA’s Senate 
sponsors expressly noted their belief that employer sanctions would 
deter future “[i]llegal immigration.”110  Highlighting this belief, 
Congress also stressed in the Senate Report that IRCA’s legalization 
would be a “‘one-time only’ program.”111 
This congressional drive to counter the appeal of U.S. jobs for 
unlawful entrants was also evident ten years after IRCA, when 
Congress passed IIRIRA, which streamlined the employer verification 
process.  The IIRIRA House report described U.S. jobs as “a primary 
magnet for illegal immigration.”112  The House report identified 
inadequate enforcement of IRCA’s employer sanctions program as a 
cardinal reason for the “failure” of U.S. immigration policy.113  Citing 
the “four million illegal aliens residing in the United States,” the 
House report savaged the flaws in IRCA’s employer sanctions 
program, castigating it as “ineffective in deterring both the hiring of 
illegal aliens and the illegal entry of aliens seeking employment.”114  
Congress’s response was not to weaken employer sanctions, but to 
strengthen the process by limiting the documents that could prove 
that a foreign national was authorized to work.115  The Congress that 
reinforced employer sanctions in this fashion would have flatly rejected 
DAPA’s blanket award of employment authorization to millions of 
unlawful entrants with no prospect of obtaining a legal status. 
                                                           
 108. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 108. 
 109. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 100 
Stat. 3359, 3360–61, 3365–68. 
 110. S. REP. NO. 99-132, at 16 (1985). 
 111. Id. 
 112. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 126. 
 113. Id. at 110. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. at 128–29 (explaining that only twenty-nine documents may be used to 
establish identification and eligibility to work, and these documents are divided by 
statute and regulation into three categories). 
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II. THE LIMITED SPHERE OF IMMIGRATION DISCRETION 
For the past half-century, U.S. immigration law has featured 
liberalized statutory grants of legal status and a shrinking sphere of 
administrative discretion.  Through much of the twentieth century, 
the immigration statute expressly authorized substantial 
administrative discretion.  However, administrative discretion existed 
in the shadow of the restrictive national origin quota system that 
Congress had established in 1925.116  In a kind of statutory quid pro 
quo, immigration officials exercised their discretion to admit 
individuals who would otherwise have been excluded by the narrow 
categories of enumerated status that Congress prescribed.  In recent 
decades, Congress has substantially liberalized the enumerated forms 
of legal status available to immigrants.  As a trade-off for that 
liberalization, Congress has cabined administrative discretion, 
recognizing that discretion outside of a limited sphere would 
undermine the contemporary framework of immigration law.  
Language on executive discretion in recent Supreme Court opinions 
must be understood against that backdrop.  In stressing Congress’s 
consistent efforts to curb the Executive Branch’s discretion in 
granting immigration benefits, the account offered here critiques the 
skewed narrative of expansive executive discretion offered elsewhere.117 
                                                           
 116. See Chin, supra note 14, at 279–83 (explaining that the Immigration Act of 
1924 provided for about 150,000 immigrant visas per year and these visas were 
awarded to a country “based on the number of American citizens who traced their 
ancestry to that nation based on the 1920 census”). 
 117. See Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 
2012 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 33 (asserting that the Court’s decision in Arizona v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) “consolidates tremendous immigration policymaking 
power in the executive branch”); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President 
and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 474–76 (2009) (suggesting that the Supreme 
Court, in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), hinted at 
concurrent authority between the legislative and executive branches concerning the 
admissibility of aliens).  The piece by Cox and Rodríguez is an important 
contribution to immigration scholarship.  However, it relies too much on 
extrapolation from dicta in a handful of Supreme Court cases that upheld statutes.  
See id. at 474–76 (discussing Knauff).  Cox and Rodríguez also point to President 
Truman’s continuation of the Bracero Program for Mexican agricultural workers 
from 1948–1951.  Id. at 485–90.  However, the analysis of the Bracero Program’s 
continuation unduly discounts the role of the Ninth Proviso of the Immigration Act 
of 1917, which furnished statutory authority for Truman’s action.  See infra notes 
146–48 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Proviso); infra notes 142–44 
and accompanying text (discussing the Bracero Program).  Because of these flaws, 
Cox and Rodríguez overstated the role of free-standing executive discretion in 
immigration law.  Cf. KATE M. MANUEL & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R42924, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:  LEGAL ISSUES 26–
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A. Bifurcated Discretionary Regimes:  Priorities and Benefits 
To understand contemporary discretion in immigration law, we 
should bifurcate discretion into enforcement priorities and affirmative 
benefits.  Congress and the courts have accorded immigration officials 
substantial leeway in framing priorities.  However, in recent years, 
Congress has repeatedly sought to limit discretionary benefits 
because of their adverse impact on deterrence.  This subsection 
explains each in turn. 
Priorities are internal guides for official discretion.  Because 
officials have limited resources, they must set priorities on what kind 
of conduct to target first.  The Supreme Court highlighted this largely 
tacit discretion in Arizona v. United States.118  In exercising discretion 
regarding priorities, immigration officials may elect to forego 
removal proceedings or may terminate proceedings in certain cases, 
just as prosecutors pursue certain kinds of criminal wrongdoing.119 
Officials establish discretionary priorities within certain operational 
limits.  In issuing priorities for their own guidance, officials do not 
establish a formal application process for the targets they plan to forego.  
Nor do officials obligingly inform targets that official forbearance will 
last until a certain date and may be renewed thereafter.120 
                                                           
28 (2013) (suggesting that prosecutorial discretion is broad but may be limited by 
Congress’s power); Margulies, supra note 77, at 118, 127–28 (discussing Cox and 
Rodríguez’s account of the Bracero Program). 
 118. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2527 (2012). 
 119. For example, immigration authorities will elect not to pursue removal of an 
individual who has been apprehended and served with a notice to appear in 
immigration court if the individual does not fit a checklist of enforcement priorities.  
See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief 
Counsel 4 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter June 2011 Morton Memo], available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf 
(reciting a list of non-exhaustive factors, including childhood arrival, ties to the 
community, and person’s criminal history); Memorandum from Doris Meissner, 
Comm’r, U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., to Reg’l Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Chief 
Patrol Agents, and Reg’l & Dist. Counsel 7 (Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Meissner 
Memo], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092970/INS-Guidance-Memo-
Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-00 (outlining factors in prosecutorial 
discretion, including “extreme youth or advanced age” of the alien).  For a 
persuasive defense of this brand of discretion, see David A. Martin, A Defense of 
Immigration-Enforcement Discretion:  The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest 
Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167, 183–86 (2012) (“Enforcement without a sense of 
proportion—or even of sensible administration in the real world of limited 
resources—will fail at restoring the rule of law in this fractious and troubled realm.”). 
 120. See Margulies, supra note 77, at 114–16, 169–76 (discussing these 
provisions of DACA). 
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In criminal law, which provides our most familiar examples of 
prosecutorial discretion, a formalized application process and an 
expressly demarcated period of forbearance would clash with the 
paradigm in place.  Prosecutors know that any use of discretion 
favorable to wrongdoers poses a problem familiar to students of 
insurance law:  moral hazard.  Moral hazard is an unintended 
consequence of insurance.  It arises because individuals who know 
they will be held harmless for wrongdoing tend to do more of it.121  
Prosecutors who exercise discretion favorable to wrongdoers ex post 
therefore strive ex ante to keep prospective lawbreakers in the dark.  
Establishing an affirmative system that would allow wrongdoers to 
apply in advance for a fixed period of forbearance would effectively 
license that wrongdoing. 
Consider the case of burglary.  When an admitted burglar is 
youthful and the burglar’s “take” is relatively modest, judges may not 
wish to sentence the offender to prison, and may look with favor on a 
plea bargain that reflects this sentiment.122  However, it would be 
difficult to imagine prosecutors soliciting applications from known 
burglars for a “burglars’ holiday” that would guarantee a specific 
period of immunity.123 
In contrast, benefits are express, not merely tacit, advantages for 
which individuals apply in advance.  If an application is successful, 
the recipient can reasonably assume that the benefit will last for a 
definite period of time.  In immigration law, such affirmative benefits 
include permission to live and work in the United States.  DAPA’s 
benefits exacerbate the problem of moral hazard that inheres in any 
                                                           
 121. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1083 
(2008) (noting that if insurance eases the penalties for misconduct, “insureds engage 
in more of that behavior”); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the 
Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1406 (1999) (explaining moral hazard 
in corporate misconduct).  See generally Baker, supra note 23, at 270–71 (discussing 
the theory of moral hazard). 
 122. See Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining:  A Case Study of El Paso 
County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV. 265, 274–75 (1987) (explaining that some tribunal 
judges felt uneasy imposing confinement in burglary cases because they observed 
that juries almost always sentenced first-time offenders to probation). 
 123. Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee and legal experts made similar 
points in connection with DAPA at a confirmation hearing for Attorney General 
nominee Loretta Lynch.  See Hearing on the Nomination of Loretta Lynch for U.S. Attorney 
General Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Jan. 29, 2015) (questioning by 
Sen. Mike Lee and Sen. Jeff Sessions and statements of professors Nicholas Quinn 
Rosenkranz and Jonathan Turley).  In response to a question from Senator Sessions, 
Professor Rosenkranz criticized “giving [lawbreakers] permits” as “unheard of [in] 
traditional prosecutorial discretion.”  Id. 
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favorable exercise of enforcement discretion.124  DAPA therefore 
clashes with repeated congressional efforts to reduce the moral 
hazard of discretionary immigration benefits.  The following 
paragraphs trace the relationship between status and benefits from 
the former regime of restrictive grants of status and wide discretionary 
benefits that prevailed until the watershed 1965 Act to the modern 
regime of broader statutory grants of status and narrower discretion. 
B. A Short History of Shrinking Discretion Over Immigration Benefits 
From 1925 to 1965, Congress rigidly limited statutory grants of 
legal status by tying them to restrictive national origin quotas.  
Congress took this step to mark a retreat from the virtually 
unchecked immigration that characterized U.S. policy through the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.125  In the transition from 
largely unrestricted immigration to national origin quotas, Congress 
authorized administrative discretion that would leaven the harshness 
of the national origin quota system. 
The Ninth Proviso of the Immigration Act of 1917126 (“1917 Act”) is 
the best example from this period of broad, statutorily authorized 
executive discretion coinciding with narrow enumerated forms of 
legal status.  In the Ninth Proviso, Congress empowered executive 
agencies to “control and regulate the admission and return of 
otherwise inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission.”127  
Acting pursuant to this statutory authority, immigration officials 
                                                           
 124. In immigration enforcement, priorities that result in dismissing cases that 
have already been commenced raise fewer moral hazard issues than programs such 
as DAPA that invite applications from individuals not yet in the enforcement system.  
See June 2011 Morton Memo, supra note 119, at 5–6 (asserting that ICE prefers to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion early in enforcement proceedings to prevent 
unnecessary government spending).  In the former situation, an individual receives 
relief only if he is already in removal proceedings.  Typically, an undocumented alien 
will wish to avoid this situation.  As a result, relief for individuals already in removal 
proceedings does not erode deterrence as significantly as do benefits for which an 
individual can apply in advance. 
 125. See Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations:  A 
“Magic Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1127–29 (1998) (describing 
the national origins quota system, established in 1924, which preferred certain 
nationalities over others and “permitted annual immigration of up to two percent of 
the number of foreign-born persons of a particular nationality in the United States as 
set forth in the 1890 census”—a much more strict quota than existed previously ). 
 126. Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 878. 
 127. Id. 
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granted temporary admission to agricultural workers,128 refugees, and 
other foreign nationals.129  The 1952 McCarran-Walter Act repealed 
the 1917 Act, and supplanted the Ninth Proviso with a provision that 
limited the President’s discretion to admission of aliens who could 
not have ascertained their inadmissibility “by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence.”130 
The passage of the 1965 Act liberalized enumerated forms of legal 
status by abolishing national origin quotas, but also sought to close 
the “back door” of discretionary and unauthorized admissions.131  It 
was not successful in the latter respect.  Through the 1980s, the 
Executive Branch granted EVD to immigrants, allowing them to stay 
for protracted periods in the United States without a legal status.132  
Immigration officials also freely granted parole to large categories of 
foreign nationals on a number of occasions.133 
In the 1990s, Congress rolled back immigration officials’ 
discretion.  IIRIRA limited EVD134 and imposed limits on parole.135  
                                                           
 128. See R- L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 624, 625 (1943) (discussing the “blanket waiver of . . . 
inadmissibility” under the Ninth Proviso for an agricultural worker who had 
previously been ordered deported). 
 129. See Honorable J. Howard McGrath, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Address at the 
Savannah Bar Association 10 (Feb. 14, 1951), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/09/12/02-14-1951.pdf (noting the permitted 
exercise of authority under the Ninth Proviso to admit an immigrant who would 
otherwise have been inadmissible as a member of the totalitarian party). 
 130. See McCarran-Walter Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 211(c), 66 Stat. 163, 181 
(1952); Cadby v. Savoretti, 256 F.2d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 1958) (discussing the repeal of 
the INA of 1917).  The McCarran-Walter Act, including this narrowing of 
administrative discretion, was enacted over President Truman’s veto.  Office of the 
Historian, Milestones 1945–1952:  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (The 
McCarran-Walter Act), U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-
1952/immigration-act (last visited May 11, 2015). 
 131. See John A. Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 819, 828–30 (1982) (discussing the goals of 1965 Act). 
 132. See Lynda J. Oswald, Note, Extended Voluntary Departure:  Limiting the Attorney 
General’s Discretion in Immigration Matters, 85 MICH. L. REV. 152, 152, 157–58 (1986) 
(explaining that no statute or regulation explicitly allows the Executive Branch to 
grant EVD to all nationals of a specific country but that the practice began in 1960 
when the INS granted EVD status to Cubans). 
 133. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 117, at 502–05 (discussing how, prior to 
passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, the Executive Branch allowed a large number of 
Haitian and Cuban refugees to enter for humanitarian purposes). 
 134. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) (2012) (providing that permission for 
voluntary departure in lieu of removal “shall not be valid for a period exceeding 120 
days”); Barroso v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005) (asserting that 
automatic tolling does not extend the amount of time granted for voluntary 
departure); cf. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal 
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Since then, apart from the Obama administration’s DACA program, 
which is substantially larger than any past program and also clashes 
with the INA,136 administrative discretion has fallen into three limited 
categories.  First, immigration officials have granted relief that is 
either expressly authorized by Congress or ancillary to statutory 
grants of status, for example, by allowing migrants to stay in the 
country to submit applications for a status that would be available 
within a reasonable time period.137  Second, Congress has acquiesced 
in a small number of grants of relief based on hardships such as 
extreme youth, age, or infirmity.138  Third, the Executive Branch has 
provided relief tailored to emergencies abroad such as government 
repression or natural disasters.139  Within these carefully demarcated 
categories, executive officials have had broad discretion to grant 
relief; however, executive officials did not seek—until DACA—to 
expand relief beyond those categories.  Moreover, Congress has never 
authorized or acquiesced in a blanket award of benefits to a large 
group of foreign nationals, such as the 4 million prospective DAPA 
                                                           
of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 
10,324 (Mar. 6, 1997) (codified at scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.) (noting that under 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 
“for the first time, there are statutory restrictions limiting the time [to 120 days] for 
which voluntary departure may be authorized”).  Prior to these statutory changes, 
immigration officials had freely awarded grants of EVD, which had sometimes 
entailed allowing foreign nationals to remain in the United States for years without 
any hope of obtaining a legal status.  Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 
Fed. Reg. at 10,324. (acknowledging that, “[t]oo often, . . . voluntary departure has 
been sought and obtained by persons who have no real intention to depart”).  
IIRIRA halted this practice, although Congress continued to permit grants of TPS to 
foreign nationals facing exigent circumstances abroad.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1). 
 135. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 
 136. See Margulies, supra note 77, at 111, 122–23 (explaining that DACA 
establishes “a system of blanket immigration relief”). 
 137. See infra Part II.C (describing the Bracero Program, parole in retreat, cancellation 
of removal, and stays of removal as examples of expressly authorized discretion). 
 138. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets:  Examining Deferred Action and 
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2012) [hereinafter 
Wadhia, Sharing Secrets] (discussing the background of deferred action); Wadhia, 
supra note 20, at 261–62 (recognizing that a person’s medical condition influenced 
grants of deferred action, especially when coupled with separation from family); 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge:  Examining the Role 
of the Judiciary in Prosecutorial Discretion Decisions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 39, 48 
(2013) (explaining that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) released documents related to 
prosecutorial discretion in cases involving widows and widowers of U.S. citizens and 
their unmarried children under twenty-one years old). 
 139. OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 16. 
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recipients, who have no prospect of obtaining legal status in a 
reasonable period of time. 
C. Expressly Authorized Discretion 
Through much of the twentieth century, Congress delegated broad 
power to the Executive Branch to admit foreign nationals who were 
otherwise inadmissible.  The Ninth Proviso of the Immigration Act of 
1917 provided authority for the admission of foreign agricultural 
workers, and parole authority under the INA permitted the 
admission of thousands of refugees, including Hungarians fleeing 
Soviet repression after the ill-fated Hungarian Revolution in 1956.140  
This statutorily authorized discretion is not an apt precedent for 
DAPA, which lacks such authorization.  In addition, Congress has 
narrowed many forms of expressly authorized discretion, suggesting 
its wariness about executive freelancing. 
1. Expressly authorized discretion and the Bracero Program 
Some have claimed that the Bracero Program’s continuation by 
President Truman between 1948 and 1951 is precedent for DAPA.141  
However, this argument unduly discounts the clear statutory 
authority for President Truman’s action.  That authority sets 
President Truman’s action apart from DAPA. 
The Bracero Program, started in 1942, imported Mexican 
agricultural workers to cope with labor shortages during World War 
II.142  In addition to the admission of Mexican workers who were in 
the United States on a seasonal basis, the program entailed 
government transportation of the workers to growers and 
                                                           
 140. See JOYCE VIALET, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 44-151, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
POLICY:  1952–1979:  A REPORT PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF EDWARD M. KENNEDY, 
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, UPON THE 
FORMATION OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY 18 (1979), 
reprinted in 3 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 95, 114 (1980) (explaining that as a result of 
the Hungarian revolution in 1956, President Eisenhower offered asylum to 21,500 
Hungarians and that 6500 would receive visas under the Refugee Relief Act). 
 141. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 117, at 485–90 (asserting—without sufficient 
attention to the Ninth Proviso, executive actions, and definitive historical accounts—
that President Truman believed that he had unilateral authority to establish a guest 
worker program). 
 142. KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE:  THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND 
THE I.N.S. 19 (1992); RICHARD B. CRAIG, THE BRACERO PROGRAM:  INTEREST GROUPS 
AND FOREIGN POLICY 45 (1971); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON MIGRATORY LABOR, 
MIGRATORY LABOR IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 3–4 (1951); George O. Coalson, Mexican 
Contract Labor in American Agriculture, SW. SOC. SCI. Q., Jan. 1952, at 228, 232; Gerald 
P. Lopez, Don’t We Like Them Illegal?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1711, 1766–69 (2012). 
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government centers where the workers were recruited.143  The 
program became controversial in some quarters because workers 
were often tied to particular growers, lacked bargaining power, and 
worked in substandard conditions.  In 1947, after the end of the war, 
Congress decided to wind down government recruitment of foreign 
agricultural laborers.144  However, the Truman administration 
continued to admit Mexican workers based on the pleas of growers 
who needed labor to harvest crops.145 
The Truman administration’s move was not a free-floating exercise 
of executive discretion, but an action pursuant to statutory authority 
found in the Ninth Proviso146 that was heavily influenced by 
consultation with Congress.  In granting immigration officials the 
discretion to admit “otherwise inadmissible aliens,” the Ninth Proviso 
gave those officials authority to react to labor shortages or other 
pressing circumstances.147  Moreover, as a leading scholar of the 
Bracero Program noted, the House Agriculture Committee actively 
invited the continuation of the program.  The Agriculture Committee 
convened a hearing to encourage dialogue between federal 
administrators and growers on how to maintain the program, with 
the Committee announcing that it wished to “make available an 
                                                           
 143. See CALAVITA, supra note 142, at 20 (explaining that the United States paid 
for transportation from Mexican recruitment centers to places of employment); 
CRAIG, supra note 142, at 51 (contending that the Bracero Program created a 
unique bargaining system because the U.S. government functioned like an 
employer’s representative and the Mexican government functioned like a labor 
union representative). 
 144. CALAVITA, supra note 142, at 25. 
 145. Id. 
 146. CRAIG, supra note 142, at 53; see PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON MIGRATORY LABOR, 
supra note 142, at 4; Lauren Gilbert, Fields of Hope, Fields of Despair:  Legisprudential and 
Historic Perspectives on the AgJobs Bill of 2003, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 417, 426 (2005) 
(describing the Ninth Proviso as an “escape clause”).  While Cox and Rodríguez 
asserted that the Ninth Proviso did not authorize continuation of the program, they 
did not recognize that Congress’s withdrawal of funding addressed only the 
government’s role in actively recruiting foreign workers, not the admission of those 
workers.  See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 117, at 487–91 (contending that although 
the statutory authorization for the Bracero Program expired, the admission of 
temporary workers only stopped for a short time).  After Congress cut funding for 
government recruitment, growers took over that task.  See CALAVITA, supra note 142, 
at 27 (explaining that the government-to-government contracts that established the 
Bracero Program were replaced by direct grower-bracero work agreements). 
 147. Immigration & Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874, 878; 
see CALAVITA, supra note 142, at 27 (noting that the main concern with the extension 
of the Bracero Program was the growers’ acceptance of the program). 
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ample labor supply for the producers of crops which require the 
foreign labor, the stoop type of labor.”148 
While President Truman’s move did receive some congressional 
criticism, that criticism had little impact on Congress’s response.  
Criticism came only from opponents of the legislative reauthorization 
of the program in 1951.149  Supporters of the legislation, backed by 
growers, were not troubled by Truman’s move, and secured the bill’s 
passage.150  On this view, authority for President Truman’s 1948–1951 
continuation of the program stemmed not only from the Ninth 
Proviso, but also from an invitation by Congress and eventual 
legislative ratification of Truman’s move. 
2. Parole in retreat 
While the Executive Branch used parole authority aggressively 
through the early 1990s to admit categories of foreign nationals 
fleeing repression abroad,151 Congress came to view this authority as 
unduly broad.  The statute had formerly permitted the Attorney 
General to grant parole to any foreign national “for emergent 
reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest.”152  This 
language itself emerged in 1980 from congressional displeasure over 
expansive uses of discretion by the Executive Branch.153  However, the 
House Judiciary Committee complained in 1996 that this limitation 
was insufficient.  According to the Judiciary Committee, 
                                                           
 148. CALAVITA, supra note 142, at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149. See 97 CONG. REC. 4974 (1951) (quoting, in the minority report opposing 
reauthorization, the Presidential Commission’s criticism of some aspects of the 
program).  The relative ease of the Bracero Program’s reauthorization illustrates the 
hyperbole in Professors Cox and Rodríguez’s claim that the Bracero Program 
triggered a “significant power struggle” between Congress and the Executive Branch.  
See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 117, at 490.  There was no inter-branch struggle but, 
rather, merely a one-sided confrontation within Congress between a minority 
favoring U.S. organized labor and a majority eager to import cheaper Mexican 
workers.  Perhaps, viewed through the lens of today’s perspective on labor and 
immigration policy, Congress should have viewed Truman’s conduct more 
skeptically.  However, a majority of legislators declined to do so, undercutting the 
thesis advanced by Professors Cox and Rodríguez. 
 150. See CRAIG, supra note 142, at 71–72 (explaining the interests surrounding the 
codification of the Bracero Program). 
 151. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 117, at 492–99 (detailing the refugee crises 
occurring off the coast of Florida that led many thousands of immigrants to enter the 
United States without authorization). 
 152. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2012). 
 153. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 117, at 503. 
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parole authority was intended to be used on a case-by-case basis to 
meet specific needs, and not as a supplement to Congressionally-
established (sic) immigration policy.  In recent years, however, 
parole has been used increasingly to admit entire categories of 
aliens who do not qualify for admission under any other 
[immigration] category.154 
In light of these concerns, the House Judiciary Committee concluded 
that “specific limitations on the Attorney General’s discretion are 
necessary.”155  Acting on this sentiment, IIRIRA provided that parole 
would be available “only on a case-by-case basis for urgent 
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”156  As a result, 
even champions of executive discretion acknowledge it is “far from 
clear . . . today” that the Executive Branch continues to have the power 
it did before Congress limited parole authority through IIRIRA.157 
3. Narrowing cancellation of removal 
Statutory provisions for the exercise of discretion to permit foreign 
nationals to either obtain or retain LPR status also reflect Congress’s 
accelerating unease with discretion.  The INA’s cancellation of 
removal (“cancellation”) provisions illustrate this point.  I discuss 
each of these provisions in turn. 
One form of cancellation was, until IIRIRA, called suspension of 
deportation.158  The term “suspension of deportation,” was somewhat 
misleading because approval of a petition provided not merely a 
reprieve from removal, but also a grant of permanent legal status.  To 
reach this coveted outcome, foreign nationals who had unlawfully 
entered or remained in the United States confronted a daunting 
obstacle course.  They had to be physically present in the United 
States for at least seven years and deportation had to cause “extreme 
hardship” to the applicant.159  An applicant who met this test could 
receive LPR status. 
In IIRIRA, Congress made this obstacle course even more rigorous.  
Congress increased the period of time required to ten years.160  In 
                                                           
 154. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 140 (1996). 
 155. Id. 
 156. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see id. § 1182(d)(5)(B) (requiring a showing of 
“compelling reasons in the public interest with respect to [the] particular alien” 
whom the Executive Branch wishes to parole into the United States). 
 157. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 117, at 504–05. 
 158. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). 
 159. See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144–46 (1981) (defining 
“extreme hardship”). 
 160. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). 
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addition, to curb immigration officials’ discretion, Congress required 
that a foreign national show “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” (not merely “extreme hardship”).161  Moreover, the victim 
of the hardship could not be the applicant; it now had to be a 
current U.S. citizen or LPR.  These steps made post-IIRIRA 
cancellation extraordinarily difficult to obtain.  To underscore this 
difficulty, Congress limited immigration officials to a mere 4,000 
grants in any fiscal year.162 
The other form of cancellation illustrates an analogous pattern of 
curbing discretion.163  Prior to IIRIRA, LPRs who had engaged in 
criminal conduct in the United States that made them deportable 
were often eligible for relief under then INA §  212(c), which allowed 
immigration officials to exercise discretion to permit most applicants 
to keep their LPR status.  However, in IIRIRA, Congress repealed 
§  212(c).164  Congress continued discretionary relief from removal 
for an LPR who had committed a crime when that crime was not an 
“aggravated felony.”165  To limit this relief, IIRIRA also vastly 
expanded the types of crimes considered aggravated felonies, which 
now include drug trafficking, theft offenses, fraud above $10,000, and 
violence against either persons or property.166  In one fell swoop, 
Congress radically narrowed the ambit of discretion for LPRs who 
had engaged in criminal conduct in the United States. 
Many observers have regarded Congress’s measures as harsh.167  
Indeed, the Supreme Court has on more than one occasion stepped 
in to mitigate the harshness of IIRIRA.168  The Court correctly 
                                                           
 161. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). 
 162. Id. § 1229b(e)(1). 
 163. See id. § 1229b(a) (providing strict categories for cancellation of removal for 
certain permanent residents, including retaining LPR status for at least five years, 
continuously residing in the United States for seven years after receiving LPR status, 
and having no aggravated felony convictions). 
 164. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-597. 
 165. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(3). 
 166. See id. § 1101(a)(43) (listing all meanings of “aggravated felony”). 
 167. See Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1698 
(2009) (observing that relief from the harshness of removal provisions is “so 
circumscribed that it currently plays a role only at the margins”). 
 168. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11–13 (2004) (holding that drunk driving 
was not a “crime of violence” and hence not an aggravated felony); see also Hiroshi 
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:  Phantom Constitutional 
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 565 (1990) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court has refined statutory interpretation by affording a measure of 
protection to aliens in order to temper the harshness of immigration law). 
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interpreted IIRIRA, and Congress’s critics correctly identified the 
need to ameliorate the statute’s harsh effects.  That very harshness, 
however, reinforces Congress’s emphatic rejection of broad exercises 
of discretion that aided either unlawful immigrants or LPRs who had 
committed crimes.  As we shall see, Congress expressly expanded 
discretion only for unlawful immigrants with a colorable claim to an 
enumerated legal status. 
4. Stays of removal ancillary to legal status 
Since 1996, Congress has expressly expanded discretion only when 
the exercise of such discretion was ancillary to an enumerated grant 
of legal status.  The forms of enumerated status bolstered by the 
availability of discretionary relief all entailed a foreign national’s 
suffering of grievous intentional harm.  In each case, the 
discretionary relief appeared to reflect Congress’s judgment that 
applicants for such forms of status had suffered enough, and that 
removal while an award of status was pending would be inhumane. 
Consider applicants for U and T visas, which are awarded 
respectively to individuals who have been victims of crime generally 
or human trafficking in particular.169  Under the INA, an applicant 
for either status who has made out a “prima facie case for approval” is 
eligible for a stay of removal that will last until the applicant has 
actually received the visa.170  Without this relief, the limits on the 
number of visas available in a given year for each status would result 
in the removal of persons who met the substantive standard and were 
“wait[ing] in line.”171  The suffering that gave rise to the individual’s 
substantive eligibility would make removal in such circumstances 
manifestly inhumane.  Moreover, the provision of relief from removal 
served Congress’s policy goals:  it encouraged vulnerable people to 
apply for these forms of enumerated status and facilitated agency 
adjudication of the substantive eligibility question, which an 
applicant’s removal to a foreign country would disrupt.172 
                                                           
 169. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I), (U)(i)(I). 
 170. Id. § 1227(d)(1). 
 171. Noferi, supra note 34. 
 172. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426–27 (2009) (explaining that the ability 
to grant a stay of removal is rooted in historical practice and facilitates orderly 
appellate review of removal orders).  Congress provided similar relief for certain 
victims of violence against women, ensuring that individuals who as children had 
been abused by a U.S. citizen or LPR parent would not be removed if they became 
adults while their applications for relief were pending.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iv), (a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (a)(1)(D)(i)(IV). 
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D. A Bridge to Enumerated Forms of Status:  The Family Fairness Program 
While proponents of DAPA sometimes cite the Family Fairness 
program implemented by immigration officials under Presidents 
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush as precedent for DAPA,173 this 
analogy is inapposite.  Family Fairness was ancillary to enumerated 
grants of status and far smaller than DAPA.  Moreover, Congress 
ratified Family Fairness within a short period in the Immigration Act 
of 1990—a prospect that is almost certain to elude DAPA, which has 
already generated substantial congressional opposition. 
First and most importantly, Family Fairness was ancillary to 
Congress’s grant of legal status to millions of undocumented persons 
in IRCA.  Family Fairness started in the Reagan administration, when 
immigration officials confronted a wrinkle caused by the 1986 
legalization:  Congress had legalized several million undocumented 
people who had entered the United States by 1982 but did not grant 
a similar legal status to the spouses and children of IRCA 
beneficiaries.  As a result, these spouses and children were still 
vulnerable to deportation.174  However, the spouses and children of 
IRCA beneficiaries had a pathway to legal status that was more direct 
than the tangled route that DAPA recipients must traverse. 
While Congress declined to provide immediate legalization to 
these close relatives of IRCA beneficiaries, it acknowledged that 
the ordinary operation of the INA made spouses and children of 
LPRs eligible for a grant of legal status.175  Only a minor question of 
timing remained.176  Once IRCA beneficiaries gained LPR status, for 
which they were eligible within eighteen months of receiving their 
IRCA approval, spouses and children would receive a second 
preference in the yearly allocation of family-based visas established 
by the INA.177  The State Department estimates that second 
preference visa applicants typically have to wait between one and a 
                                                           
 173. Noferi, supra note 34 (citing past Republican administrations that relied on 
executive action to spur more family-friendly action concerning immigration). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See S. REP. NO. 99-132, at 4 (1985) (citing to an increase in the “immediate 
relatives” category in the United States because under “present law” there were no 
limits for this kind of family unification). 
 176. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report declared that “families of legalized 
aliens . . . will be required to ‘wait in line’ in the same manner as immediate family 
members of other new resident aliens.” Id. at 16. 
 177. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2)(A) (authorizing immigrant visas for “spouses or 
children” of LPRs). 
MARGULIES (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2015  1:56 PM 
1218 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1183 
half to two years for their applications to become “current.”178  In 
other words, noncitizen spouses and children of IRCA beneficiaries 
might wait only three and a half years from the date of an IRCA 
approval for their visas.179 
Given the relatively short waiting time for a spouse or child’s 
receipt of a visa, an immigration official assessing enforcement 
priorities in the ordinary course of business might approve relief 
from removal.180  The Reagan administration institutionalized this 
practice by making deferred action available if those relatives could 
show compelling circumstances.181  By May 1989, as Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) Commissioner Alan C. Nelson told the 
House Subcommittee on Immigration, immigration officials had 
issued blanket approvals for deferred action for “young children” of 
IRCA beneficiaries.182 
Leading members of Congress urged further liberalization of this 
policy.  In the 1989 hearing, Representative Bruce Morrison, the 
chair of the House Subcommittee on Immigration, questioned the 
wisdom of “having enforcement resources directed at [IRCA 
beneficiaries’ immediate relatives], . . . the class of people we 
generally try to make it easy to have join their family members.”183  
Another leading legislator, Representative Howard Berman of the 
House Subcommittee, praised the “creative ways” that INS had found 
to address the issue of removal of relatives that Congress had “wanted 
[INS] to deal with.”184  INS Commissioner Nelson acknowledged that 
                                                           
 178. See Visa Bulletin for December 2014, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Dec. 2014), 
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/law-and-policy/bulletin/2015/visa-bulletin-
for-december-2014.html (noting that January 2013 visa applications for second 
preference beneficiaries from Mexico were current in December 2014, meaning that 
these applicants could enter the United States). 
 179. While waiting times can vary, other provisions of the INA supplied a six and a 
half year ceiling on a spouse or child’s wait.  Five years after receiving LPR status, an 
immigrant can apply for naturalization and become a U.S. citizen.  At that time, a 
spouse or child of the immigrant is considered an “immediate relative” entitled to 
admission without a waiting period.  8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 180. Admittedly, such relief would become increasingly likely as the sponsor of the 
foreign national got closer to U.S. citizenship. 
 181. See Noferi, supra note 34 (discussing how the Reagan administration provided 
relief for entire families as opposed to simply children). 
 182. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 Oversight:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st 
Cong. 459 (1989) [hereinafter IRCA Oversight Hearing] (statement of Alan C. 
Nelson, INS Comm’r). 
 183. Id. at 463 (statement of Rep. Bruce Morrison). 
 184. Id. at 479 (statement of Rep. Howard Berman). 
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legislators seeking to keep families together had raised “a legitimate 
issue.”185  In response, Morrison invited Nelson to submit a list of 
IRCA reforms including deferred action.186  Morrison’s invitation 
signaled that Congress would applaud INS’s use of discretion in favor 
of IRCA beneficiaries’ immediate relatives. 
President George H.W. Bush’s administration heard leading 
legislators’ pleas and further liberalized the standard, making 
deferred action available to all spouses and children of IRCA 
beneficiaries.187  That grant of deferred action included relief from 
removal and work authorization while spouses and children of IRCA 
beneficiaries waited for their visas to become current.  Shortly after 
the McNary announcement, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 
1990188 (“1990 Act”), which expressly prohibited the removal of 
spouses and children of IRCA beneficiaries who had entered the 
United States as of 1988 and made them eligible for work 
authorization.189  All of the relief provided under both Family 
Fairness and the 1990 Act was ancillary to legal status that would be 
available to recipients within a reasonably short period in the ordinary 
course of immigration law. 
In addition to being ancillary to Congress’s grant of legal status to 
IRCA beneficiaries, the Family Fairness program was modest in scope.  
As of 1989, only 10,644 people had applied for relief under the 
Reagan program.190  In 1990, new INS Commissioner Gene McNary 
predicted that the expanded Family Fairness program would assist 
approximately 100,000 spouses and children of IRCA beneficiaries.191 
                                                           
 185. Id. at 464 (statement of Alan C. Nelson, INS Comm’r). 
 186. Id. 
 187. McNary Memo, supra note 19, at 164. 
 188. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. 
 189. Id. § 301(a). 
 190. IRCA Oversight Hearing, supra note 182, at 403 (statement of Alan C. 
Nelson, INS Comm’r). 
 191. The OLC Opinion erroneously asserted that “Family Fairness” deferred the 
deportation of 1.5 million people.  See OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 14 (stating that 
the Family Fairness program “authorized granting extended voluntary departure 
and work authorization to the estimated 1.5 million spouses and children of aliens 
who had been granted legal status under the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986”).  President Obama has spoken about this misleading statistic.  See “This 
Week” Transcript:  President Obama, ABC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2014, 11:06 AM) 
http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/week-transcript-president-obama/story?id=27080731 
(“If you look, every president—Democrat and Republican—over decades has done 
the same thing.  George H W Bush—about 40 percent of the undocumented 
persons, at the time, were provided a similar kind of relief as a consequence of 
executive action.”).  Journalists analyzing the Family Fairness program’s relevance to 
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In sum, the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush deferred action 
programs were a bridge to a statutory grant of status in two ways.  
First, they stemmed from IRCA’s vast legalization initiative.  Congress, 
in enacting IRCA, had already dealt with the biggest problem posed 
by immigration reform then and now:  granting legal status to a large 
group of undocumented adults.  Once Congress made it over that 
hump, a grant of lawful status to beneficiaries’ spouses and children 
was principally a matter of timing.  Second, deferred action for this 
group of dependents resembled similar action taken for non-IRCA 
LPR sponsors whose spouses and children would be eligible for an 
immigrant visa within a bounded period.  In both the IRCA and 
ordinary immigration context, deferred action for relatives of LPRs 
eliminated the hardship and disruption caused by deporting relatives 
who could within a discrete period claim a legal status. 
In contrast with Family Fairness, DAPA offers work authorization 
and relief from removal to a huge group of foreign nationals with a 
long and uncertain route to legal status.  Recall that unlawful 
entrants with post-entry U.S.-citizen children cannot even apply for an 
immigrant visa until their children turn twenty-one.192  For DAPA 
recipients who are parents of very young U.S.-citizen children, that 
could entail a wait of over twenty years.  In addition, a foreign 
national who has been unlawfully present in the United States for a 
year or more is subject to the ten-year bar, and so must spend ten of 
                                                           
DAPA have noted the inaccuracy of this claim.  See Glenn Kessler, Obama’s Claim that 
George H.W. Bush Gave Relief to ‘40 percent’ of Undocumented Immigrants, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/11/24/ 
did-george-h-w-bush-really-shield-1-5-million-illegal-immigrants-nope (citing statements 
from former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Commissioner McNary, 
who told the Washington Post, “I was surprised it was 1.5 million when I read 
that. . . .  I would take issue with that.  I don’t think that’s factual”).  In fact, by 
October 1, 1990, INS had received only 46,821 applications.  Id.  While some higher 
estimates of potential Family Fairness recipients were floated at the time, former 
officials looking back at those estimates viewed them as puffery, perhaps calculated 
to expand INS’s budget.  See id. (referencing a retired career official, who explained 
that internally, “estimates were routinely inflated” to obtain necessary resources 
because the agency, then-part of the Justice Department, was often “short-changed”).  
Legislators would have been far more likely to rely on statistics of actual participation 
provided by INS.  See IRCA Oversight Hearing, supra note 182, at 403 (referring to the 
Special Agricultural Worker Program, former Commissioner Nelson provided the 
specific number of applications filed but qualified this number by testifying that INS 
must investigate fraudulent applications, which would lower the final number). 
 192. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
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those years outside the United States.193  DAPA recipients who do not 
wish to leave the United States for ten years and live apart from 
minor children who remain here may have to wait thirty years to be 
eligible for LPR status.  That combination of protracted waiting time 
and prolonged enforced absence from the United States erects 
materially greater barriers to legal status than the short waiting 
period required of the spouses and children of IRCA beneficiaries.  
Compounding the distinctions between DAPA and Family Fairness, 
DAPA also offers work authorization and relief from removal to 
parents of LPRs, who have no ability under current law to petition for 
a visa.194  In its opinion supporting DAPA’s legality, OLC breezily 
touts potential DAPA beneficiaries’ “prospective entitlement to lawful 
immigration status.”195  Given the sadly remote prospects for this 
cohort, OLC might as well have claimed that the narrator in The 
Beatles’ classic ballad of anguished absence, “The Long and Winding 
Road,” will promptly find his beloved conveniently located in an 
apartment down the hall.  The Beatles’ narrator was hopeful despite 
the odds; Congress has deliberately given prospective DAPA 
recipients little reason for analogous aspirations.  That legislative 
choice is regrettable, but it is Congress’s to make. 
                                                           
 193. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).  Because a DAPA recipient must have been 
physically present in the United States for at least five years, the vast majority of 
potential DAPA beneficiaries will be subject to the ten-year bar. 
 194. See id. § 1153(a) (excluding parents of LPRs among family members 
eligible for immigrant visas). 
 195. OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 29.  Despite this unsupported optimism, even 
OLC acknowledges that DAPA would “likely not permit all [recipients] to remain 
together with their children for the entire duration of the time until a visa is 
awarded,” assuming that the children stayed in the United States and the recipients 
had to leave because they had entered without being “inspected and admitted or 
paroled into the United States.”  Id. at 29 n.14 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)).  However, OLC vastly understated the percentage of DAPA 
recipients who would face this obstacle to legal status.  A substantial percentage of 
undocumented persons have entered the United States without inspection.  This 
percentage rises to over ninety percent for unlawful immigrants from Mexico.  Virtually 
all of these immigrants would have to leave the United States to apply for LPR status, 
and virtually all would then be subject to the ten-year bar.  See Douglas S. Massey & 
Fernando Riosmena, Undocumented Migration from Latin America in an Era of Rising 
U.S. Enforcement, 630 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 294, 304 (2010) (noting that 
“well over 90 percent of Mexican migrants simply crossed the border without 
inspection rather than entering with a visa and then violating its terms by staying too 
long”).  Despite this considerable understatement by OLC of the barriers facing 
DAPA recipients, OLC’s acknowledgment of the problem’s existence suggests the 
distance between DAPA and the INA. 
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E. Hardship-Based Deferred Action 
In the individual setting, immigration officials have also granted 
deferred action in a relatively small number of hardship cases.  These 
cases typically include the extremely young, extremely old, or 
extremely infirm.196  For example, immigration officials might grant 
deferred action in the case of an elderly foreign national suffering 
from Alzheimer’s disease.  While Congress has never expressly 
authorized deferred action in such cases, the exercise of discretion in 
cases of severe hardship does not undermine the statutory 
framework.  Individuals who are very young, very old, or infirm are 
few and far between, so granting them relief does not adversely affect 
the deterrence that Congress sought to build into the INA.197  
Moreover, by definition, most recipients of such individualized 
discretion do not require work authorization and cannot take away 
jobs from citizens or LPRs—the very young are too young to work, 
the very old too old, and the infirm have physical or mental 
challenges that make work impossible.  Granting deferred action in 
such cases does not present the economic risks that Congress 
associated with wide access of undocumented persons to the U.S. 
labor market.  Hardship-based discretion is therefore not an apt 
analogy for DAPA. 
F. Dicta in Supreme Court Cases Does not Authorize DAPA 
OLC and supporters of DAPA point to language in two Supreme 
Court opinions extolling prosecutorial discretion in immigration 
law.198  Reading this language broadly may create the impression that 
DAPA falls within immigration officials’ ambit of discretion.  
However, the language cited does not expand the overall scope of 
congressional delegation to immigration officials, which occurs only 
in the carefully cabined areas discussed above.  Read in context, the 
                                                           
 196. See Wadhia, Sharing Secrets, supra note 138, at 33–34; Wildes, supra note 69, at 
830–31 (listing the factors and number of cases where each factor was determinative). 
 197. Wildes, supra note 69, at 831 (pointing out that a third of the deferred action 
cases were granted on the basis of extreme hardship). 
 198. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (noting “broad 
discretion exercised by immigration officials”); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 483–84 (1999) (noting that “[a]t each stage [of the 
removal process] the Executive has discretion to abandon the endeavor . . . in a 
regular practice (which had come to be known as ‘deferred action’) of exercising 
that discretion for humanitarian reasons or simply for its own convenience”); see also 
OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the broad discretionary power granted 
to immigration officials as found in AADC and Arizona). 
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language in each opinion is dicta dealing with enforcement priorities, 
not with the blanket award of benefits. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions protect executive discretion in 
setting enforcement priorities against incursions by two groups that 
could undermine the immigration law framework:  migrants seeking 
a more formal mechanism for discretionary decisions that would 
result in more relief but elongate the removal process, and individual 
state governments seeking broader and less discerning enforcement 
that would drain federal resources or trigger conflicts with foreign 
nations.  The Court’s decisions protected executive discretion over 
priorities from such external threats, but did not expand discretion 
over categorical awards of benefits. 
Consider the context of Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee (AADC),199 in which the Court held that Congress could bar 
judicial review of individual decisions to commence deportation 
proceedings.200  The case dealt with expressly delegated discretion—
Congress’s power to insulate the executive decision to start the 
removal process from a foreign national’s request for judicial 
review.201  The plaintiffs in AADC, who were foreign nationals whom 
immigration officials sought to deport, had argued that the INA 
authorized judicial review of decisions to initiate deportation 
proceedings prior to entry of a final administrative order of 
removal.202  Justice Scalia, in his opinion for the Court, viewed the 
                                                           
 199. 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 200. Id. at 485, 487–88, 492. 
 201. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2012); AADC, 525 U.S. at 477–78. 
 202. See AADC, 525 U.S. at 479–80 (arguing that prior to an entry of a final order 
of removal, constitutional claims must be reviewable by a court); cf. David A. Martin, 
On Counterintuitive Consequences and Choosing the Right Control Group:  A Defense of Reno 
v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 363, 365, 370–75 (2000) (discussing benefits of the 
AADC decision, including greater efficiency and enabling the exercise of discretion 
in an alien’s favor without fear of triggering the formal model that would ultimately 
hamper administrative decision making); Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective 
Deportation and the First Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 319–
20 (2000) (discussing concerns that drove the AADC decision, including worry that 
forcing the government to litigate reasons for starting removal proceedings could 
reveal sensitive national security information).  This same concern with avoiding 
undue delay in removal proceedings drove earlier decisions that regarded deferred 
action as discretionary.  See, e.g., Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1017 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (denying judicial review sought by an alien of an official decision to 
proceed with deportation); Romeiro de Silva v. Smith, 773 F.2d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 
1985) (granting summary judgment that denied review sought by the alien); 
Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 659 (11th Cir. 1983) (denying the alien’s petition 
for review of INS’s decision to deny his application for a deferred action status); cf. 
Perales v. Casillas, 903 F.2d 1043, 1047, 1053 (5th Cir. 1990) (vacating an injunction 
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potential for such piecemeal litigation as antithetical to Congress’s 
intent to avoid “separate rounds of judicial intervention outside the 
[INA’s] streamlined process.”203  To head off this train wreck, the 
Court found that Congress intended to shield certain individual 
discretionary decisions from judicial review.204 
Supporting the view that Congress wished to insulate decisions to 
initiate deportation, Justice Scalia observed that discretionary 
decisions to defer the start of deportation proceedings could similarly 
promote efficiency in the administrative process.205  Justice Scalia’s 
opinion for the Court reflected a narrow, hardship-based conception 
of executive discretion, not the broad, categorical view exemplified 
by DAPA.  Justice Scalia cited only one case on deferred action, Johns 
v. Department of Justice,206 which involved relief ancillary to a potential 
grant of legal status.  The facts of Johns require attention because they 
exemplify the individualized discretion that has long characterized 
relief from removal. 
In Johns, the court upheld deferred action for Cynthia, a five-year-
old Mexican girl, who was the subject of a bitter custody dispute 
between two U.S. citizens who wished to adopt the girl, and her 
biological mother, a Mexican national.207  Deportation while the 
custody dispute was pending might have impaired resolution of the 
                                                           
sought by foreign national plaintiffs who had contested immigration officials’ refusal 
to grant them voluntary departure and employment authorization).  In defending 
DAPA, Professor Legomsky has cited Mada-Luna, Romeiro, Pasquini, and Perales as 
standing for the proposition that immigration officials have sufficient discretion to 
award the sweeping relief embodied in the new program.  See Legomsky Testimony, 
supra note 2, at 7.  However, like the Supreme Court’s decision in AADC, the 
rationale of decisions denying judicial review sought by a respondent in removal 
proceedings prior to entry of a final order of removal is the concern about delays in 
the removal process.  These decisions do not address the scope of discretion for 
granting benefits to large groups of foreign nationals without a reasonable prospect 
of obtaining legal status. 
 203. AADC, 525 U.S. at 485. 
 204. See id. at 487 (explaining that provision interpreted by the Court was 
“specifically directed at the deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence prolongation 
of removal proceedings”). 
 205. See id. at 483–85 (explaining that the Executive has the discretion, based on 
its own convenience, to abandon its use of deferred action). 
 206. 653 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 207. The prospective adoptive parents brought Cynthia to the United States when 
she was one day old.  Id. at 886.  Immigration officials believed that Cynthia had been 
brought to the United States illegally.  Id.  They placed her in deportation 
proceedings but then granted her deferred action, concluding that the most prudent 
course would be to delay deportation pending resolution of the custody dispute in 
Florida Family Court.  Id. 
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dispute.  Moreover, if the U.S. couple prevailed in the custody 
dispute, Cynthia’s removal to Mexico would have hindered 
enforcement of the family court judgment.  In addition, removal 
would have been both pointless and harsh if the U.S. couple 
ultimately prevailed in their custody case.  As a minor child of U.S. 
citizens, Cynthia would have been entitled to immediate relative 
status under the INA with no wait for a visa.208  Deporting an 
individual who has a visa immediately available does not serve the 
goals of U.S. immigration law.209  Justice Scalia’s citation to Johns 
bolsters the individualized account of discretion over benefits.  It is 
hardly an endorsement of the categorical use of executive discretion 
in DAPA to benefit foreign nationals with no practical prospects of 
obtaining legal status. 
The Court’s discussion in Arizona v. United States is similarly 
cabined.  In Arizona, the Court held that federal law preempted 
portions of Arizona’s immigration statute.210  Writing for the Court, 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that executive discretion focused on 
the “equities of an individual case”211 and observed that the Framers 
were wary of state interference in the foreign affairs of the new 
republic.212  Justice Kennedy cited John Jay’s argument in The 
Federalist No. 3 that states might be rash in their approach to foreign 
affairs, and that the disparate policy preferences of individual states 
could imperil the Framers’ goal of a uniform, national foreign 
policy.213  Federal discretion over priorities in individual cases could 
smooth out these bumps in the road.  All of Justice Kennedy’s 
discussion, including his statement that federal officials “must decide 
whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all,”214 reflects this 
                                                           
 208. See id. at 888, 890 (referencing tender age as a reason for deferral). 
 209. In AADC, Justice Scalia also extensively cited an immigration treatise viewing 
deferred action as a “humanitarian” measure in cases involving compelling 
individual circumstances.  AADC, 525 U.S. at 484 (citing 6 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY 
MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 72.03(2)(h) 
(1998)).  This reference buttresses the view that Justice Scalia was referring only to 
case-by-case hardship-based discretion over benefits and not to blanket relief. 
 210. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (preempting a 
provision criminalizing failure to comply with federal alien-registration 
requirements, a provision criminalizing the unauthorized seeking or engaging in 
work, and a provision authorizing arrests for deportable offenses). 
 211. Id. at 2499. 
 212. Id. at 2498–99, 2505 (describing the well-settled constitutional state 
preemption doctrine and basic federalism principles). 
 213. See id. at 2498–99 (emphasizing the importance of a unified foreign relations 
policy, especially to protect U.S. nationals who are abroad). 
 214. Id. at 2499. 
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concern about the deleterious effects of federal-state clashes on 
immigration policy.  In warning about the danger of state 
commandeering of national priorities, Justice Kennedy did not 
address the boundaries of executive discretion when Congress, rather 
than the states, sought to constrain that discretion.215 
G. Conclusion 
In sum, discretion over benefits exists in a narrow range of cases.  
These include discretion expressly authorized by Congress, ancillary 
to a statutory grant of legal status, based on hardship, or triggered by 
exigencies abroad.  This list is consistent with the INA and past 
practice.  More expansive awards of immigration benefits clash with 
the INA’s carefully crafted framework. 
                                                           
 215. Two U.S. district courts have recently come down on opposite sides regarding 
DAPA.  One court rejected a challenge to DAPA on standing grounds but also 
offered dicta on the merits suggesting that DAPA was a lawful exercise of discretion.  
See Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 194, 199, 209 (D.D.C. 2014).  However, the 
Arpaio court failed to acknowledge the distinction between discretion that acted as a 
bridge to legal status and discretion unmoored to status.  Another court, addressing 
the issue from the odd procedural posture of a sentencing proceeding for a foreign 
national who would probably not be DAPA-eligible, found that DAPA was 
inconsistent with the INA.  See United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 
785–86 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (finding that mere congressional inaction does not 
authorize presidential action).  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
also opined that states violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution’s 
Fourteenth Amendment if they decline to provide driver’s licenses to DACA 
recipients but provide them to other deferred action recipients.  See Ariz. Dream Act 
Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1063–67 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that there is no 
rational basis to distinguish between the DACA recipients and other deferred action 
recipients and thereby granting a preliminary injunction), stay denied, 135 S. Ct. 889 
(2014).  The Ninth Circuit in Arizona Dream Act Coalition similarly failed to 
acknowledge the difference between DAPA and other, more modest traditional 
forms of deferred action.  For a case that initially found that a DHS employee had 
standing to sue regarding DACA’s legality, see Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 
724, 740 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (finding that immigration officers challenging DACA’s 
legality had standing because of the risk of job-related discipline if they refused to 
implement the program’s provisions, and expressing doubts about the legality of 
program), vacated, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O, 2013 WL 8211660, at *1, *2 (N.D. Tex. July 
31, 2013) (holding that the lawsuit was an employment dispute governed by a 
collective bargaining agreement and the Civil Service Reform Act and, therefore, 
that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Crane 
v. Johnson, No. 14-10049, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5573 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2015). 
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III. OF DISCRETION AND DELIBERATION:  RULEMAKING, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW OF ENFORCEMENT, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 
Given this carefully devised legislative framework, it is not 
surprising that the precipitous announcement of a sweeping 
executive policy would trigger concerns under established principles 
of administrative law.  Three questions present themselves.  The first 
is whether DAPA is an “interpretive rule” or “policy statement” that 
DHS can merely announce, or whether it is a “legislative rule” that 
requires activating the rulemaking process mandated by the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), including notice-and-comment 
procedures that require informing relevant stakeholders.  The 
second is informed by the first, even though in some ways it is 
logically antecedent:  whether agency enforcement decisions are 
reviewable.  The third question is whether, as a substantive matter, 
DAPA is consistent with the INA.  I address the first two questions in 
this Part, and the substantive question in Part IV. 
A. DAPA, Deliberation, and the Need for Rulemaking 
A central feature of agency action is rulemaking, which requires 
notice to stakeholders of a proposed rule, an opportunity for 
stakeholders to comment, and agency response to that feedback prior 
to promulgation of a final rule in the Code of Federal Regulations.216  
Federal officials did not use the notice-and-comment process before 
announcing DAPA.  Under the APA, an “interpretative rule” or 
“general statement[] of policy” does not require notice and 
comment, while a “legislative rule” does.217  The choice is a fateful 
one, pitting administrative convenience against the importance of 
deliberation.218  This section briefly discusses the rationale for notice-
                                                           
 216. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012) (listing requirements that must be included in 
the notice); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203–04 (2015); Chrysler 
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979) (referencing substantive rules that 
implement statutes as having the force and effect of law). 
 217. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1203–04. 
 218. The procedural question of whether rulemaking is required is distinct from 
the substantive question of whether agency action fits the statute that empowers the 
agency to act.  An agency directive can be an interpretive rule and not require resort 
to the rulemaking process but still be substantively invalid.  Under the APA, issues of 
procedure and substance typically constitute distinct and different inquiries.  See id. 
at 1207–08.  Nevertheless, in certain cases a substantive conclusion will dictate a 
procedural one.  For example, in Lincoln v. Vigil, the Court held that a decision to 
close a regional program for Native American children and reallocate the resources 
devoted to the program to nationwide efforts to assist such children was entirely 
within the agency’s discretion since Congress had allocated the funds to run such 
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and-comment procedures.  It then explains why DAPA is best viewed 
as a legislative rule requiring resort to the rulemaking process.219 
Notice-and-comment procedures fit the model of legislative 
delegation that informs administrative law.  Congress’s delegation to 
agencies rests on its assumption that agencies will deliberate carefully 
before acting.  In its deliberations, an agency will weigh the 
complementary and competing values that Congress identified when 
it passed legislation.  Notice-and-comment procedures require an 
agency to deliberate about its rules against the backdrop of these 
values and take other perspectives into account.220  These procedures 
reduce agency arbitrariness and maximize the soundness of agency 
action.221  As the Framers knew, the chance to consider a problem 
from a spectrum of stakeholder perspectives ensures more refined 
deliberation,222 encouraging government to eschew hasty, arbitrary, 
                                                           
programs to the agency in a lump-sum appropriation with no additional constraints.  
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993).  Since the agency’s announcement of its 
decision to close the program dealt solely with matters entirely within the agency’s 
discretion, that announcement was merely a “general statement of policy” that did 
not require notice and comment.  Id. at 197.  In contrast, when an agency’s 
discretion is constrained by Congress in some manner, the APA’s substantive and 
procedural inquiries will be distinct. 
 219. The district court addressing DAPA’s legality found that it was a legislative 
rule requiring notice and comment.  Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 
WL 648579, at *56 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-40238 (5th Cir. 
Feb. 23, 2015). 
 220. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DHS, 653 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 221. Id.; cf. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 144 (1967) (noting that the “broad 
public notice and opportunity to participate required by [rulemaking procedures is] 
necessary  . . . as an aid to the agency in seeing the ramifications of the problem and 
arriving at an optimum solution”); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and 
Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 403 (arguing that the notice and comment 
procedure is important because “[a] rule is likely to be a better product if its drafters 
must consider seriously alternatives that they might have overlooked or take account 
of practical problems that otherwise would crop up only after a rule goes into 
effect”); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 
92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 408 (2007) (asserting that the rigor imposed by notice-and-
comment procedure is important because the “lack of procedural discipline can raise 
the risk of agency action that serves rent-seeking interests or does not properly 
engage public preferences”). 
 222. HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 242 (1954) (noting the process 
through which an “issue is forced into the open that it may show itself from all sides, 
in every possible perspective”).  The Framers’ own perspective was shaped by the 
classical tradition of political deliberation that also forged Arendt’s thought.  See 
John L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and Constitutional Thought, 45 
B.C. L. REV. 499, 519 (2004); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 
1503 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1547 
n.37 (1988).  Agency decision making at its best strives to embody the deliberation 
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or invidious impulses and focus on the virtues and drawbacks of a 
decision.  That said, it would be inefficient to require an agency to go 
through APA rulemaking procedures every time it wishes to convey 
instructions to agency personnel.  The notice-and-comment process 
can be cumbersome, and requiring it in all cases would paralyze the 
administrative state.  To balance these virtues of efficiency and 
deliberation, courts have derived distinctions between interpretive 
rules and statements of policy on the one hand, and legislative rules 
on the other.   
The distinctions between these categories of agency directives flow 
from the nature of congressional delegation to administrative 
agencies.223  According to courts, agencies act legislatively when they 
convert a vague or open-ended statutory term into binding norms 
that substantially influence the legal benefits, disabilities, or interests 
of parties affected by the rule.224  Courts have viewed Congress as 
being cognizant of the potential for administrative arbitrariness when 
agencies implement open-ended delegations.225  An agency that 
converts broad statutory language into specific directives may be 
under- or over-inclusive in implementing Congress’s intent.  While 
these concerns may ultimately play out in substantive review of agency 
decisions,226 requiring notice-and-comment procedures provides a 
preliminary check on arbitrariness.  Stakeholders commenting on a 
proposed regulation will inform the agency of possible flaws in the 
rule’s rationale, coverage, or drafting.  The agency will then have an 
                                                           
that the Framers prized.  See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration:  Rethinking 
Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 460 (2010) 
(discussing the Framers’ views in the context of models of agency decision making). 
 223. Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617 F.3d 490, 494–96 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 224. Id.; Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 595 n.19, 
596 (5th Cir. 1995); Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (per curiam).  Courts have recognized that resolving what rules are 
legislative in character can be difficult.  See Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 818 F.2d at 946 
(noting that this distinction is “tenuous,” “fuzzy,” “baffling,” and “enshrouded in 
considerable smog” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Scholars have eased this 
task while also acknowledging its challenges.  See Asimow, supra note 221, at 383–
84; Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 565, 570 (2012) (observing that “[d]istinguishing between nonlegislative 
and legislative rules is one of the most complex tasks in administrative law”); David 
L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 
YALE L.J. 276, 278–79 (2010); Kristen E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 465, 476, 480 (2013). 
 225. Catholic Health Initiatives, 617 F.3d at 495. 
 226. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000) 
(holding that the FDA lacked statutory authority to regulate the tobacco industry). 
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opportunity to take these concerns into account in its deliberations.  
In its final regulatory product, the agency will also have to explain 
why it heeded some concerns but discounted others. 
In refining the deliberative process, notice-and-comment 
procedures also serve separation of powers concerns.  Because the 
notice-and-comment process can head off certain substantive 
challenges to agency action, it minimizes judicial intrusion into 
agency decision making.  Instead of requiring judicial intervention, 
which can create its own risk of arbitrariness,227 the agency has an 
opportunity to correct its own mistakes.  Since agencies, unlike 
Article III courts, are subject to substantive legislative oversight, 
notice-and-comment procedures also preserve democratic legitimacy. 
The district court in Texas was correct in noting that the first 
element in deciding whether an agency action constitutes a legislative 
rule is whether that rule has a “significant” impact on stakeholders.228  
The D.C. Circuit recently held that an agency action will be 
considered “legislative” in character when it constitutes a binding 
norm that works “a substantial regulatory change” to the underlying 
regime.229  In Electronic Privacy Information Center v. DHS,230 the D.C. 
Circuit ruled that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
policy requiring either full-body screening, which allowed TSA 
employees to view the “naked” image of a screened individual or 
conduct a bodily search if the individual refused, “substantially 
change[d] the experience of airline passengers.”231  As a result, the 
                                                           
 227. See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996) (observing 
that courts seek to avoid “arbitrary choices,” and prefer “democratic legitimacy” and 
administrative expertise embodied in notice-and-comment procedures). 
 228. Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579, at *53 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
16, 2015) (citing Shalala, 56 F.3d at 595 n.19) (discussing “rules that award rights, 
impose obligations, or have other significant effects on private interests”), appeal filed, 
No. 15-40238 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2015). 
 229. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DHS, 653 F.3d 1, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n does not change 
that analysis because the Court held only that a revision of an interpretive rule is 
also by definition an interpretive rule, even if the later rule materially changes the 
earlier directive.  Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015).  In 
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, the parties stipulated that the previous rule was interpretive.  
Id. at 1205. 
 230. 653 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 231. Id. at 7; see Shalala, 56 F.3d at 601–02 (holding that the agency rule at issue 
was not subject to notice-and-comment procedures because it was a statement of 
policy that did not cause a substantive change in regulations); see also Pickus v. U.S. 
Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting an agency directive’s 
“impact on ultimate agency decisions” regarding parole of federal prisoners); Lewis-
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court held, the policy was not merely “interpretative.”232  Rather, the 
decision was legislative in character, requiring use of notice-and-
comment procedures. 
DAPA has a substantial impact on noncitizens.  While DAPA does 
not change the legal status of any foreign nationals in the United 
States, it profoundly affects their legal interests.  DAPA provides 
undocumented foreign nationals with an official document allowing 
those individuals to remain in the United States for a specific time 
period.233  Moreover, as Judge Hanen discerned, the program 
constitutes a “massive change in immigration practice.”234  Immigration 
officials designed the program to give valuable immigration benefits 
such as work authorization and a reprieve from removal to 4.3 
million undocumented foreign nationals who have no clear path to a 
legal status.235  Even OLC, in the course of defending DAPA, 
recognized that its scale was without parallel in the annals of 
executive discretion.236 
                                                           
Mota v. Sec’y of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 481–82 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting that the agency 
directive dealing with employment of aliens in various occupations had “substantial 
impact” because it impeded efforts of aliens to find employment and efforts of 
employers to find qualified workers). 
 232. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 7. 
 233. Texas, 2015 WL 648579, at *55. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 30–31 (recognizing that DAPA would 
“likely differ in size from [earlier] deferred action programs” and that the “potential 
size of the program is large”).  OLC confirmed this point in a backhanded way in its 
specific description of the number of people that DAPA could affect.  The OLC 
Opinion conceded that DAPA would confer benefits on “approximately 4 million 
individuals.”  Id. at 30.  The OLC Opinion then asserted that 4 million individuals 
constitute “only a fraction” of the “approximately 11 million undocumented aliens” 
in the United States.  Id. at 31.  As a matter of arithmetic, OLC was literally correct:  4 
million is indeed “a fraction” of 11 million.  However, since 4 million is more than a 
third of 11 million, OLC’s use of the qualifier “only” seems misplaced.  Perhaps OLC 
would also say that in 1941, Ted Williams “only” hit .406!  After all, the “Splendid 
Splinter” only exceeded DAPA’s fraction by a measly four percent. 
OLC’s language reflects substance, not merely word choice.  Here, as elsewhere, 
DAPA seems to lack a limiting principle.  Suppose that DAPA covered 10 million of 
the estimated 11 million undocumented individuals in the United States.  It is 
literally true that 10 million is also “a fraction” of 11 million.  However, in that latter 
case, the fraction amounts to over ninety percent.  Presumably, OLC would agree 
that under the INA, immigration officials could not provide ninety percent of 
undocumented individuals with work authorization and a reprieve from removal.  See 
id. at 7 (noting that immigration officials cannot abdicate their responsibilities 
entirely).  Yet OLC provided no principle for distinguishing the thirty-six percent of 
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The next element is whether the challenged action establishes a 
“binding norm.”  That test focuses on the action’s effect on the 
agency’s own decision makers.237  In assessing whether an action 
binds agency decision makers, courts look to whether the agency 
guidance gives decision makers a range of factors on which to base a 
decision, or whether the guidance prescribes a particular outcome.238  
The latter is far more likely to produce the conclusion that the 
challenged action is a “binding norm,” legislative in character.  In 
addition, in determining whether a challenged action is a binding 
norm, courts will consider the action’s practical effect, not merely the 
language that the agency has used.239 
Courts’ provision of greater leeway to agency guidance that 
announces a range of criteria has its roots in notions about the scope 
of delegation that the agency has received from Congress.  When an 
agency publishes guidance that permits individual decision makers to 
use a sliding scale, a court will likely defer to the particularized, finely 
grained judgment used in such cases, and view the application of 
such finely grained judgment as consistent with the legislative 
scheme.  At first blush, allowing an individual agency decision maker 
to select the appropriate blend of factors that will be dispositive in a 
particular case may seem like a recipe for subjective decision making.  
However, courts have viewed this flexibility as useful in avoiding 
arbitrariness and subjectivity because it preserves the agency official’s 
ability to consider the circumstances of a particular case and the 
arguments made by individual stakeholders. 
In contrast, courts have kept agencies on a tighter leash when 
agency guidance was “unbending,”240 robbing agency decision 
makers of the opportunity to tailor their decisions to the 
circumstances of a particular case.241  An agency may have the power 
to issue such inflexible guidance.  However, to reduce the risk that 
guidance will be arbitrary, agencies should rely on the deliberation 
built into the notice-and-comment process.  For example, in his 
opinion in Guardian Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Federal Savings & 
                                                           
undocumented individuals potentially granted benefits under DAPA from this latter, 
apparently impermissible, figure. 
 237. Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 
1995); Texas, 2015 WL 648579, at *53. 
 238. Shalala, 56 F.3d at 599. 
 239. Id. at 596. 
 240. See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 241. Id. 
MARGULIES (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2015  1:56 PM 
2015] THE BOUNDARIES OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION 1233 
Loan Insurance Corp.,242 Judge Leventhal classified certain procedural 
requirements for bank audits as part of a general statement of 
policy, not a legislative rule.243  Judge Leventhal explained that in 
practice government bank examiners had the discretion to accept 
an audit report that did not conform to the agency’s guidance, as 
long as that report had other indicia of reliability.244  Judge 
Leventhal attached crucial importance to the agency decision 
maker’s freedom to base a decision on those other factors when the 
overall situation warranted this flexibility.245 
Courts have been particularly attentive to the risk of arbitrariness 
posed by reducing agency discretion to numerical formulas.246  A 
numerical formula that specifies amounts or times as essential 
elements of compliance or eligibility could be arbitrary in one of 
two ways.  First, the formula could be radically over-inclusive:  it 
could make it too easy for individuals to qualify for a benefit, or 
subject regulated entities to needless agency intrusions that 
Congress did not envision.247  The formula could also be markedly 
under-inclusive, shutting out people entitled to a benefit, or failing 
to regulate individuals or entities that Congress intended to reach.  
In each situation, an agency that converts a vague statutory term 
into “numerical terms” risks arbitrary action that undermines 
legislative intent.248 
As an example of the arbitrariness created by numerical formulas, 
consider Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius.249  In Catholic Health 
Initiatives, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
issued a formula governing when premiums hospitals paid to certain 
insurers in whom the hospitals had a financial stake would qualify as 
                                                           
 242. 589 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 243. Id. at 665–66. 
 244. Id. at 666. 
 245. Id. at 668. 
 246. Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617 F.3d 490, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2010); 
FRIENDLY, supra note 221, at 144–45 (observing that an “agency’s statement of a 
principle in numerical terms” is “peculiarly suited for rule-making” because it is 
“legislative” in character (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 247. Cf. Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 598–99 
(5th Cir. 1995) (noting that “rote determination whether a given case is within the 
rule’s criteria” is a hallmark of legislative rules (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 945–47 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a 
rule was legislative when it established “action levels” of contaminants in food that 
would allow companies with contaminants below those levels to avoid agency 
enforcement action). 
 248. Catholic Health Initiatives, 617 F.3d at 495. 
 249. 617 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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reimbursable “reasonable costs” under Medicare.250  According to the 
HHS formula, officials would not deem these premiums to be 
“reasonable costs” if the insurer had more than ten percent of its 
assets invested in U.S. equity securities.251  The rationale for the 
agency directive was that stocks are more risky than other kinds of 
investments.  The rule was presumably designed to ensure that the 
insurers made prudent investments so that they would remain viable 
as insurers, and to ensure that the insurance firms were bona fide 
insurers, not merely investment vehicles for the hospitals.252  The 
court found that the formula was the product of “arbitrary choices” 
that required notice-and-comment procedures.253 
While these choices may not be substantively unreasonable,254 they 
are arbitrary since a particular number, such as the ten percent figure 
in Catholic Health, may be no more reasonable than other numbers 
that are almost identical.  Without the deliberation provided by the 
rulemaking process, the formulaic choice made by the agency might 
stem from “hunch or guesswork or even the toss of a coin.”255  
Consider the ten percent level for investments in U.S. equity 
securities that the agency designated in Catholic Health.  Insurer A, 
which instead invested twelve percent of its assets in U.S. stocks, might 
also be acting prudently, if its investment advisers used traditional 
indicia of sound investing, such as selecting companies with a low 
price/earnings ratio.  Conversely, Insurer B, which invested only 
eight percent of its assets in stocks, might be acting imprudently if its 
investment advisers were unduly aggressive in their investment 
advice, investing only in speculative Internet companies that did not 
currently make a profit.  It is arbitrary in the Catholic Health sense to 
deprive the agency decision maker of the ability to both approve 
reimbursement of premiums paid to prudent insurer A and deny 
premiums paid to imprudent insurer B.  An agency might still be 
able to take this more inflexible approach, but it would need to first 
                                                           
 250. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) (2012). 
 251. Catholic Health Initiatives, 617 F.3d at 492. 
 252. Id. at 493. 
 253. Id. at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170–71 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 254. Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 170. 
 255. Id. (finding that notice and comment procedures were required when an 
agency sought to implement the “secure containment” standard of the Animal 
Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2151 (2012), by mandating that animal dealers accommodate 
“Big Cats” within an eight-foot perimeter fence as opposed to a fence that measured 
seven and a half feet). 
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have the larger conversation with stakeholders embodied in the 
rulemaking process. 
The existence vel non of a binding norm hinges on facts on the 
ground, not on the labels the agency uses to describe its actions.  
Courts recognize that agencies have incentives to cloak binding 
norms in the language of discretion, to avoid the rigors of 
rulemaking.  The label that an agency puts on its use of power is not 
determinative.256  Courts view agency language critically in light of the 
agency’s “track record.”257  The absence of discretion in practice was 
central to the decision in Pickus v. U.S. Board of Parole,258 in which 
the D.C. Circuit held that notice-and-comment procedures were 
required for a set of computations regarding parole eligibility that 
left little or no room for the parole board’s exercise of discretion in 
particular cases.259  Even though the court conceded that parole 
determinations were committed to agency discretion,260 it held that 
the guidance’s “formalized criteria” made parole eligibility a “purely 
mechanical operation.”261  Hence the court regarded the directive 
as legislative in nature. 
As Judge Hanen found, there is precious little practical discretion 
in DAPA’s planned operation.  There is no discretion to grant relief if 
an applicant has compelling equities, but fails to meet DAPA’s 
criteria.  Judge Hanen observed that if DHS officials find that an 
applicant does not meet the criteria set out, such as continuous 
residence in the United States since January 1, 2010, officials must 
                                                           
 256. Prof’ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 
1995) (citing Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
 257. See id. (noting focus on “what the agency does in fact” (citing Brown Express, 
Inc., 607 F.2d at 700)); Family, supra note 224, at 576; see also Phillips Petrol. Co. v. 
Johnson, 22 F.3d 616, 619 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that, despite the agency’s 
announcement that its rule was interpretive, the rule had substantive effects and was 
therefore not interpretive).  Here, too, Judge Leventhal’s analysis is insightful.  See 
Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 666–67 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (observing that, “[i]f it appears that a so-called policy statement is in 
purpose or likely effect one that narrowly limits administrative discretion, it will be 
taken for what it is[—]a binding rule of substantive law,” and also noting that “[t]he 
mere existence of some discretion is not sufficient, although it is necessary, for a rule 
to be . . . a general statement of policy[, and]. . . stringent substantive commands are 
not removed from [the requirement for notice-and-comment procedures] because 
they have some provision for discretionary waiver”). 
 258. 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 259. Id. at 1113. 
 260. Id. at 1110. 
 261. Id. at 1113. 
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summarily deny the application.262  An applicant with four and a 
half years of continuous residence will not receive relief under 
DAPA, even if, for example, that applicant has a U.S.-citizen child 
with a serious medical condition that could not be treated adequately 
in the applicant’s country of origin.  As discussed above, that may well 
be a reasonable choice, but it is inherently “arbitrary” in the Catholic 
Health sense.  Because of that arbitrariness, notice-and-comment 
procedures are appropriate. 
The government’s experience with DACA, the only deferred 
action program to even approach DAPA’s projected size and scope, 
is part of the agency’s “track record” on discretion.  As Judge Hanen 
found, DACA’s operation testifies not to the exercise of discretion, 
but to discretion’s absence.  The government’s own statistics 
demonstrated that it had granted DACA relief to over ninety-five 
percent of DACA applicants.263  Officials denied DACA applications 
only for failing to meet criteria, having a criminal record, errors in 
filling out the form, or fraud—all factors governed by or closely 
related to DACA’s formula.264  Judge Hanen noted that supervisors 
must review certain denials of DACA relief, thus sending another 
signal that denials are disfavored.265  In this sense, DHS’s dutiful 
disclaimers about the preservation of discretion ring hollow, as 
Judge Hanen rightly found.266 
The absence of discretion as a practical matter is also evident from 
immigration officials’ rapid processing of applications for DACA 
renewals, which involved a longer removal reprieve than the initial 
round of DACA approvals.  Although immigration officials had 
pledged to the district court that they would delay implementation of 
all of the changes announced in November 2014 pending the court’s 
decision, the government instead proceeded with the three-year 
DACA renewal period it had just announced.  Immigration officials 
approved over 100,000 DACA renewal applications in about eleven 
weeks.267  For asylum-seekers and other noncitizens with a colorable 
                                                           
 262. Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579, at *54–55 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 16, 2015), appeal filed, No. 15-40238 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2015). 
 263. Id. at *55 n.101. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at *55. 
 266. Id. 
 267. See Defendant’s Advisory 3, Texas v. United States, Civ. No. 14-254 (S.D. Tex. 
Mar. 3, 2015), available at http://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
03/Amnestyadvisory.pdf; Aaron Nelson, Administration’s Immigration Policy Comes 
Under Fire:  Federal District Judge Questions Whether Justice Department Lawyers Misled Him 
on Deferral Guidelines, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 20, 2015, at B1.  In April 2015, Judge 
MARGULIES (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2015  1:56 PM 
2015] THE BOUNDARIES OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION 1237 
claim to a legal status expressly authorized by Congress who often 
wait inordinately long periods for relief,268 immigration officials’ 
headlong rush to approve applications by noncitizens without any 
such colorable claim to status is a cruel irony.  While too many 
meritorious applications by asylum applicants languish in the recesses 
of DHS back offices, the government’s race to renew DACA 
applications provides no evidence of even a perfunctory review.  The 
government “talks the talk” of discretion when it describes DACA.  
However, as Judge Hanen observed, this neutral language is a 
“pretext”269 masking a regime of rote approvals.  Such mechanical 
norms may be appropriate; however, they require the deliberation 
ensured by the rulemaking process.270 
                                                           
Hanen found that DHS and its lawyers had violated his order and reneged on their 
commitments to the court.  See Texas v. United States, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45482, 
at *20–23 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2015).  He also found that the Justice Department lawyer 
representing the government had failed to comply with her duty of candor toward 
the court.  Id. at *23.  In his decision, Judge Hanen decided not to impose the 
extreme sanction of striking the government’s pleadings, although he indicated that 
he might impose a more modest remedy.  Id. at *24. 
 268. See Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 805, 815–16 (2015) (discussing waits experienced by asylum-seekers requesting 
employment authorization). 
 269. Texas, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18551, at *187 n.101. 
 270. On April 7, 2015, the Fifth Circuit denied standing to the plaintiffs in Crane v. 
Johnson, No. 14-10049, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5573 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2015).  This 
decision, moreover, does not vitiate this argument.  In Crane, the court described 
DACA as a program in which officials retain case-by-case discretion.  Id. at *6.  
However, this description occurred in review of a record that was sparser than the 
record on which Judge Hanen based his decision in Texas.  Moreover, the issue in 
Crane was far different.  The issue of discretion arose in Crane because a number of 
the plaintiffs were DHS agents who alleged an injury-in-fact based on employee 
discipline they would suffer if they failed to cooperate in DACA grants.  According to 
the plaintiffs, this risk of discipline was a harm that supported their standing to sue.  
Id. at *23.  The court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated any reason to 
believe that they would suffer employee discipline.  Id. at *21–25.  By contrast, a 
procedural APA challenge needs to show only that as a practical matter, the 
challenged directive constitutes a binding norm.  As noted in the text, courts make 
this assessment based on the agency’s entire track record.  A plaintiff arguing that an 
agency directive is a legislative rule does not need to show that officials were 
reprimanded, suspended, or fired when they failed to approve applications within 
the agency’s formula.  That standard would preclude virtually all procedural APA 
challenges.  In cases like Professionals & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 
592 (5th Cir. 1995), and Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987), courts have found that the challenged directive was a binding norm 
without any evidence of employee discipline for failing to follow the agency’s rule.  
See 56 F.3d at 596; 818 F.2d at 946.  In this sense, the standing issue in Crane and the 
APA challenge in Texas are apples and oranges. 
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B. DAPA and the Reviewability of Enforcement Policies 
DAPA’s impact on the carefully crafted framework of the INA 
makes it reviewable under established principles of administrative 
law.  Courts have distinguished a “statement of a general enforcement 
policy,”271 which is reviewable, from “single-shot,” discrete non-
enforcement decisions, which carry a presumption of non-
reviewability.272  As this subsection explains, DAPA belongs in the 
former category. 
Administrative law has long accepted the presumption that agency 
action is reviewable.273  The shift to a presumption against 
reviewability of single-shot enforcement decisions is an exception that 
should be narrowly read.  This pivot with respect to individual 
enforcement springs from an inference about Congress’s respect for 
agency expertise and a judgment that judicial review would reduce 
the predictability and uniformity of agency decision making. 
These themes first emerged in Heckler v. Chaney,274 in which the 
Supreme Court addressed a claim by death penalty opponents 
arguing that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had 
failed to proceed against producers of drugs required for lethal 
injections.275  The respondents in Chaney sought a court order 
requiring the FDA to commence proceedings against the drug 
manufacturers.276  Holding that the FDA’s decision in that particular 
case was unreviewable, the Court invoked Congress’s view of the 
special province of administrative agencies.277  According to the 
Court, it was reasonable to assume that Congress regarded the 
informal “balancing . . . of factors”278 in such individual decisions as 
suited to the agency’s expertise.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit noted in a subsequent case applying the 
Court’s rationale in Chaney, such decisions are necessarily “ad hoc” 
and “context-bound” “assessments of fact, policy, and law.”279  
Moreover, as the Supreme Court explained in Chaney, the agency was 
                                                           
 271. Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676–77 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 272. Id. 
 273. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967) (finding that 
congressional intent in the APA allowed for review of a “broad spectrum” of 
administrative action). 
 274. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 275. Id. at 823–25. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 837–38. 
 278. Id. at 831. 
 279. Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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in the best position to determine if action in a given case was 
consistent with its priorities and the resources it could bring to 
bear.280  The Court in Chaney analogized an agency’s “refusal to 
institute proceedings” to prosecutorial discretion in the criminal 
justice system, such as prosecutors’ decisions “not to indict.”281  The 
Court noted that this type of decision “has long been regarded as the 
special province of the [e]xecutive [b]ranch.”282 
Challenges to such single-shot decisions would undermine the 
predictability and uniformity of agency enforcement.  Consider the 
challenge in Chaney to the FDA’s decision not to proceed against 
certain drug manufacturers whose products were used in lethal 
injections.283  Allowing judicial review would have ushered in a parade 
of special-interest challenges to discrete non-enforcement decisions.  
The Supreme Court apparently worried that courts would lack clear 
standards for adjudicating such cases284 precisely because each 
challenge would entail a different mix of policy, fact, and law.285  
Inevitably, courts would apply a shifting set of standards that could 
befuddle agencies and their stakeholders.  This deluge of challenges 
would trigger a tragedy of the commons in which multiple 
                                                           
 280. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831–32 (noting that the “agency is far better 
equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper 
ordering of its priorities” including “whether agency resources are best spent on 
this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether 
the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, 
and . . . whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all”); 
cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (recognizing the 
importance of prosecutorial discretion in criminal law enforcement, which hinges 
on factors such as the “strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence 
value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the 
Government’s overall enforcement plan”). 
 281. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832. 
 282. Id. 
 283. See id. at 823 (alleging that the drugs used in lethal injections violated the 
federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). 
 284. See id. at 830 (“[I]f no judicially manageable standards are available for 
judging how and when an agency should exercise its discretion, then it is impossible 
to evaluate agency action for ‘abuse of discretion.’”). 
 285. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 188–89 (1994) (discussing “uncertainty and excessive litigation” that can 
arise from burgeoning private litigation); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 662 (2000) (noting a similar concern regarding 
implied private rights of action for violation of federal statutes, which critics claim 
can “disrupt an agency’s priorities”). 
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challengers with private agendas could undermine the uniformity 
and predictability of agency action.286 
In contrast, courts have held that a “statement of a general 
enforcement policy” is reviewable.287  The review of general 
enforcement policies entails analysis of purely legal questions, such as 
the “commands of the substantive statute.”288  Consistency of a 
general enforcement policy with statutory commands provides a 
“meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of 
discretion.”289  Courts are well-suited to conduct such legal analysis.290  
Moreover, judicial review of general enforcement policy curbs agency 
arbitrariness.  Without that check, agency officials may be tempted to 
promulgate policies based on personal bias or political expediency.291  
Unchecked, such decisions might amount to a “conscious[]” 
“abdication of . . . statutory responsibilities.”292  Divergent ideological 
agendas at the policy level, like judicial second-guessing of single-shot 
enforcement decisions, could undermine the uniformity and 
predictability of agency decision making. 
DAPA is a “general enforcement policy” that should be reviewable 
under Chaney and its progeny.  DAPA’s eligibility criteria are broad 
(entry into the United States by a certain date and U.S.-citizen or LPR 
                                                           
 286. Cf. Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand:  Coordination Functions of the Regulatory 
State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 600–03 (2010) (discussing prisoner’s dilemma games, in 
which parties seek short-term private objectives that undermine aggregate welfare, 
and coordination games, in which multiple equilibria could be equally beneficial, 
but noting that the difficulty of coordinating the actions of private parties engenders 
uncertainty); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1138–45 (2012) (discussing coordination games in the 
context of overlapping agency jurisdiction).  Judicial review of challenges to discrete 
non-enforcement decisions would create a massive coordination problem between 
courts and agencies.  A presumption of unreviewability eases these problems. 
 287. See Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (finding statements of general enforcement policies reviewable). 
 288. See id. at 677 (focusing less on the “fact[s], polic[ies], and law[s] that drive an 
individual enforcement decision”). 
 289. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830. 
 290. Cf. Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 
1374, 1393–94, 1404 (2009) (discussing institutional competence arguments in 
national security litigation). 
 291. See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161–62 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) 
(holding reviewable an alleged blanket agency decision to decline to enforce civil 
rights laws against educational institutions receiving federal funds).  The Adams court 
relied on a distinction akin to the distinction between priorities and benefits 
discussed in this Article.  See infra notes 308–09 and accompanying text. 
 292. Crowley, 37 F.3d at 677 (citing Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4). 
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children).293  Disqualifying criteria (such as a criminal record) are 
narrow.294  While OLC’s opinion supporting DAPA characterizes it as 
“case-by-case” decision making,295 DAPA’s sweeping criteria will 
dictate outcomes in most cases.296  The discretion exercised under 
DAPA has already occurred at the policy level, in the formulation of 
eligibility criteria.  Officials applying those criteria may exercise some 
residual discretion.  For example, officials considering DAPA 
applications may reject applications if an applicant is charged with a 
crime, even if the applicant has not yet been convicted.297  However, 
virtually any policy leaves some such discretion in place.  DAPA’s 
broad eligibility criteria do most of the work.  A court can readily 
assess whether those criteria are consistent with the INA’s overall 
framework, making DAPA a reviewable “general enforcement policy.”298 
Ironically, DAPA’s supporters have provided the most persuasive 
evidence that “case-by-case” decision making under DAPA is a 
chimera.  Professor Legomsky, in recent testimony before Congress, 
analogized DAPA to DHS’s earlier DACA program.299  Professor 
Legomsky acknowledged that DACA has had a ninety-five percent 
approval rate.300  Most people would say that a ninety-five percent 
approval rate is high.  Indeed, Professor Legomsky acknowledged this 
first impression.301  However, Professor Legomsky then attributed the 
outstanding performance of DACA applicants to their overall “strong 
cases.”302  In reality, the strength of the cases stemmed from DACA’s 
underlying criteria, which were easy to meet. 
As a comparison, suppose a law professor furnished students with 
an advance copy of the professor’s own answers to the final exam.  Lo 
                                                           
 293. November 2014 DAPA Memo, supra note 2, at 4 (requiring entrance into the 
United States before the individual’s sixteenth birthday, continuous presence in the 
United States since January 1, 2010, graduation from high school or receipt of a 
GED, and no convictions of certain criminal offenses). 
 294. See id. (including “being a terrorist or national security threat, certain 
convictions or conduct relating to gangs, conviction of an ‘aggravated felony’ . . . , 
conviction of any felony, conviction of three or more misdemeanors that arise from 
three separate incidents, or conviction of one ‘significant misdemeanor’”). 
 295. OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 11. 
 296. Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579, at *55 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
16, 2015) (finding that under DAPA, discretion will be “virtually extinguished”), 
appeal filed, No. 15-40238 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2015). 
 297. I am indebted to Steve Legomsky for this example. 
 298. See Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 299. See Legomsky Testimony, supra note 2, at 10. 
 300. Id. at 10 n.8. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
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and behold, the answers given by students were stellar!  Befitting this 
sublime performance, nineteen out of twenty students in the class 
received an A.  Despite the students’ astronomical grades, no law 
professor worthy of the name would consider such an exam rigorous.  
It is safe to assume Professor Legomsky would not dream of assessing 
his students in such a slapdash fashion.  Executive officials purporting 
to do the will of Congress should be no less demanding. 
Unfortunately for DAPA’s supporters, more rigorous criteria would 
undermine the point of the program, which is to provide benefits 
that Congress is unwilling to legislate.  Suppose, for example, that 
DHS required undocumented parents of post-entry U.S.-citizen 
children to show that their children would undergo “exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship” if the parents were removed.303  If that 
standard sounds familiar, it should—that is the standard Congress 
has set for cancellation of removal.304  As we have discussed, that 
standard is extraordinarily difficult to meet, as Congress intended.305  
However, setting a standard this rigorous would exponentially 
diminish the pool of people eligible for DAPA, harking back to the 
regime of hardship-based discretion that is now in effect for 
individuals without a reasonable prospect of obtaining legal status.  
Immigration officials issued DAPA because they believed that the 
status quo was inadequate.  DAPA would be a failure on its own 
terms, if not in terms of the relevant law, if it yielded a volume of 
benefits no greater than the current regime. 
Impaled on the horns of this dilemma, DAPA’s supporters have 
evoked the rhetoric of case-by-case adjudication without setting 
criteria that ensure its reality.  Rather than attempting to persuade 
the public that chimeras exist, the executive officials who drafted 
DAPA would better serve the cause of constitutionalism by holding 
themselves to a higher standard.  This would entail the admittedly 
challenging task of crafting arguments that would sell the worthy 
cause of immigration reform to Congress and to each recalcitrant 
legislator’s constituents.306 
                                                           
 303. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2012) (identifying the standard for 
qualifying for a cancellation of removal under IIRIRA). 
 304. Id. § 1229b(b)(1). 
 305. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.  Of course, Congress’s 
standard is tougher still since the INA requires ten years of physical presence in the 
United States instead of the five years that suffice under DAPA.  See supra note 160 
and accompanying text. 
 306. Although this political fix for legislative gridlock is cumbersome, messy, and 
uncertain, it is ultimately better for our democracy than viewing gridlock as an 
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Courts are well situated to persuade DAPA’s executive drafters to 
take that constitutionally salutary course.  Courts can readily assess 
whether DAPA comports with the INA, including legislative policies 
deterring reliance on post-entry U.S.-citizen children, unlawful 
presence, and work by foreign nationals without a colorable claim to 
a legal status.  Courts can also assess whether DAPA’s broad criteria fit 
within the parameters of past discretion over immigration benefits.  
Therefore, no presumption of unreviewability applies. 
Abdication is a special concern where the general policy involves 
not merely agency “refusal to institute proceedings”307 against 
individuals who have failed to comply with a statute, but also the 
blanket award of benefits to individuals who have defied statutory 
directives.  The award of benefits to those who have flouted 
fundamental statutory norms heightens the moral hazard inherent 
in any favorable exercise of discretion.  It thus imperils the integrity 
of the statutory scheme.  As the D.C. Circuit stated in Adams v. 
Richardson,308 where it reviewed the Nixon administration’s alleged 
failure to enforce nondiscrimination provisions on federal education 
funding, “[i]t is one thing to say the Justice Department lacks the 
resources necessary to locate and prosecute every civil rights violator; 
it is quite another to say [federal officials] may affirmatively continue 
to channel federal funds to defaulting schools.”309  The award of 
benefits winks at wholesale statutory violations, risking collapse of 
Congress’s carefully wrought framework. 
Indeed, the wholesale grant of such benefits may well remove 
DAPA from the realm of agency action, and restore it to the domain 
of agency action, where the presumption of reviewability holds full 
sway.  Consider the employment authorization awarded to DAPA 
beneficiaries.  Congress has consistently articulated the view that the 
“employment of illegal aliens . . . causes deleterious effects for U.S. 
workers.”310  DAPA’s blanket awards of employment authorization to 
millions of undocumented foreign nationals clash with this 
                                                           
occasion for unilateral executive action.  For a different view, see David E. Pozen, Self-
Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 48 (2014) (suggesting that the 
executive and legislative branches both engage in self-help that responds to obstinacy 
by the other branch, while conceding that developing norms for regulating self-help 
is challenging and that it is unclear whether increased use of self-help would be 
healthy for democratic values). 
 307. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 835 (1985). 
 308. 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 309. Id. at 1162. 
 310. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 126 (1996). 
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congressional policy assumption.311  OLC’s acknowledgment of the 
risks of such blanket awards makes DAPA a knowing and 
“conscious[]” abdication under Chaney.312  That reckless clash is a 
sufficient reason to classify DAPA as a reviewable blanket grant of 
benefits, rather than unreviewable agency inaction. 
IV. CHEVRON AND THE CASE AGAINST DEFERENCE TO DAPA 
Upon review, DAPA is unworthy of the deference that courts 
sometimes show to agency decisions.  In Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,313 the Supreme Court noted that the test 
for deference has two prongs.314  A court first asks whether the statute 
is ambiguous.  If step one is satisfied, the court moves on to step two, 
asking whether the government’s interpretation is reasonable.  DAPA 
fails at Chevron’s step one because the INA clearly rules out the 
blanket award of benefits to unlawful entrants that DAPA contemplates. 
In construing ambiguity, courts must keep in mind that “[i]t is a 
‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a 
statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in 
the overall statutory scheme.’”315  The court should “fit, if possible, 
all parts into an harmonious whole.”316  Moreover, the Court 
observed in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,317 which 
                                                           
 311. The OLC acknowledged the difference between setting priorities and 
individualized relief on the one hand and the categorical award of benefits on the 
other.  See OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 20 (noting differences between deciding on 
priorities for removing foreign nationals and programs that “invite individuals . . . to 
apply” for immigration benefits such as work authorization).  However, it viewed 
this distinction as illusory because it regarded immigration officials’ discretion over 
work authorization as absolute.  See id. at 21 n.11 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) 
(2012)) (defining an “unauthorized alien” barred from employment as an alien 
not “admitted for permanent residence, or . . . authorized to be so employed by 
[the INA] or by the Attorney General”).  As I discuss in the next Part, the OLC’s 
account interprets immigration officials’ discretion far too broadly, uninformed by 
any intelligible limiting principle that respects the INA’s deterrence goals.  
Congress could delegate such unfettered discretion to immigration officials.  
However, the INA’s emphasis on deterrence makes it unreasonable to believe that 
Congress has done so here. 
 312. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831 n.4. 
 313. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 314. Id. at 842–43. 
 315. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 
(2007) (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)). 
 316. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133 (citing FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 
385, 388 (1959)). 
 317. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
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addressed whether the FDA had authority to regulate the tobacco 
industry, “common sense” is vital in assessing how “Congress is likely 
to delegate a policy decision of . . . economic and political magnitude 
to an administrative agency.”318 
Delegation in administrative law is driven by reasonable inferences 
about the scope of delegation intended by Congress.  The Supreme 
Court has viewed “common sense” as requiring a correlation between 
the magnitude of an agency action’s effects and the specificity of the 
statutory authorization for such action.319  As the Court has put it, 
Congress does not customarily “hide elephants in mouseholes.”320  
Courts should require a clear statement from Congress for an agency 
decision that entails a change of enormous legal and “political 
magnitude” in the overall statutory scheme.321  If a statute does not 
expressly provide an agency with authority to decide a matter of 
exceptional importance for the overall statutory framework, courts 
should be reluctant to find implicit authority to resolve this issue 
lurking in a more generic delegation.  The courts will be even more 
skeptical when Congress has repeatedly addressed the issue in a way 
that seems inconsistent with the proposed regulatory action. 
Reflecting this doctrine, in Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court 
rejected the FDA’s attempt to use generic statutory language to 
authorize regulating the tobacco industry.322  The Court viewed such 
language as insufficient evidence that Congress intended to delegate 
to the FDA authority to affect the U.S. economy in such a substantial 
                                                           
 318. Id. at 133. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); MCI Telecomms. 
Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (holding that the FCC overreached in 
eliminating rate regulation for “40% of a major sector of the industry” on the 
theory that regulation was only necessary when markets were uncompetitive, and 
further holding that it was “highly unlikely that Congress would leave the 
determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-
regulated to agency discretion”). 
 321. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133.  Justice Breyer, when he was a judge on 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, articulated this point well.  See 
Mayburg v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984) 
(observing that the touchstone is what “a sensible legislator would have expected 
given the statutory circumstances[;]. . . [t]he less important the question of law, the 
more interstitial its character . . . the less likely it is that Congress . . . ‘wished’ or 
‘expected’ the courts to remain indifferent to the agency’s views”).  Conversely, 
Justice Breyer implied, there is greater occasion for judicial scrutiny when the 
question is one of great magnitude because a legislator might well have wished to 
weigh in on such a high-stakes issue.  Id. at 104. 
 322. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126. 
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fashion, given repeated congressional acknowledgment of tobacco’s 
economic importance.323  Similarly, in ABA v. FTC,324 the D.C. 
Circuit found that the Federal Trade Commission Act, viewed in 
context, did not authorize the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to 
regulate the legal profession.325 
As the ABA court explained, the agency bore the burden of 
showing a clear textual warrant for a change from the status quo of 
state regulation of lawyers.326  Because the burden of proof is on the 
agency in such cases, a lack of a clear statement precluding such 
agency action “is not enough per se to warrant deference.”327  Rather, 
the text and structure of the statute “must  . . . make it appear that 
Congress either explicitly or implicitly delegated authority” to the 
agency to take the action proposed.328  In ABA, the court found that 
the “length, detail, and intricacy of the [statute]” supported an 
inference that Congress did not intend to authorize regulation of the 
legal profession, which had not been the subject of previous 
regulation and was not mentioned in the statute.329 
DAPA defies the common-sense construction of legislative 
delegations that the Supreme Court has required.  The policy 
advanced by DHS conflicts with INA provisions that deter unlawful 
entry and continued unlawful presence in the United States, limit 
unlawful entrants’ ability to work, and curb unlawful entrants’ and 
overstays’ reliance on post-entry U.S.-citizen children to acquire legal 
status.  Moreover, DAPA is a vast change in the nature and scope of 
discretionary grants of immigration benefits, which have been ancillary 
to statutory grants of legal status, related to individualized hardships, 
or triggered by foreign crises.  Congress has pushed back vigorously 
against far less sweeping examples of discretion.330  Common sense 
suggests that Congress could not have intended to delegate to DHS 
authority to order a change that clashed with so many provisions of 
the INA and dwarfed past paradigms of discretionary relief. 
This lack of common sense is particularly compelling given the 
INA’s language on the role of the agency, which highlights both the 
individualized nature of executive discretion and the need to adhere 
                                                           
 323. Id. at 137. 
 324. 430 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 325. Id. at 467. 
 326. Id. at 471–72. 
 327. Id. at 469. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. See supra notes 313–29 and accompanying text. 
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to the statutory framework.  The INA stipulates that the Attorney 
General (joined by the DHS Secretary) should “establish such 
regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other 
papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he 
deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of 
this [Act].”331  While the reference to what the Attorney General 
“deems necessary” may suggest substantial discretion, the section 
tethers official discretion to the “provisions” of the INA.  This 
language does not appear to grant the Attorney General authority to 
act in ways that clash with the INA’s overall framework. 
A similarly generic character pervades language charging DHS with 
“[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and 
priorities.”332  Both sections smack of statutory truisms.  Of course, 
the Attorney General should “perform . . . acts . . . he deems 
necessary.”333  The Attorney General should certainly not do anything 
unnecessary.  Along these lines, the charge to DHS in the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 simply conveys that this huge department, which 
also includes the Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management 
Administration, and counterterrorism and cybersecurity units, has 
inherited the immigration portfolio that belonged to the Justice 
Department before 9/11.  The language conveys no mandate to 
disregard multiple provisions of the INA or depart freely from settled 
practice on the parameters of discretion.334 
Finally, the same mundane conclusion governs the definition of 
“unauthorized alien” for employment purposes as a foreign national 
who is not an LPR or “authorized to be . . . employed by this chapter 
or by the Attorney General.”335  This section was designed to guide 
employers who might otherwise be uncertain about how to avoid 
sanctions for hiring undocumented workers.  More concretely, one 
can read the section as an acknowledgment that the Attorney General 
has limited discretion over benefits that are ancillary to a legal status, 
based on special hardships, or triggered by crises abroad.  Nothing in 
the language even hints that immigration officials can award work 
                                                           
 331. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 332. 6 U.S.C. § 202(5). 
 333. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3). 
 334. The same analysis prevails for language defining unlawful presence as 
presence in the United States “after the expiration of the period of stay authorized 
by the Attorney General.”  Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii).  Again, the language is generic 
and does not suggest that immigration officials can establish vast new programs that 
defer removal for foreign nationals with no clear path to a legal status. 
 335. Id. § 1324a(h)(3). 
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authorization to an enormous cohort of unlawful entrants with no 
direct path to a legal status.  In other words, this language is just the 
kind of “mousehole” that, per Justice Scalia’s caution in Whitman,336 
cannot accommodate the elephant of blanket discretion that the 
government has purported to discover. 
Since unlimited discretion would undermine virtually any 
regulatory scheme, a plausible account of executive discretion 
requires some intelligible limiting principle.  The only intelligible 
principle evident in OLC’s defense of DAPA is the claim that DAPA 
recipients would have a “prospective entitlement to lawful immigration 
status.”337  OLC asserts that this entitlement distinguishes DAPA 
recipients from parents of recipients under DHS’s DACA 
program.338  OLC advised that parents of DACA recipients had no 
“prospective lawful status” and hence could not be included within 
the new program.339  While this distinction may on the surface make 
the legal defense of DAPA appear tempered and reasonable, 
sometimes appearances deceive.  Given the minefield that Congress 
has placed in DAPA recipients’ path to legal status, including waiting 
until their children turn twenty-one years of age,340 requiring that 
most leave the United States to apply for LPR status341 and imposition 
of a ten-year bar once they do so,342 OLC’s heralding of DAPA 
recipients’ “prospective lawful status” must be news to them and any 
other careful reader of the INA. 
This is an awfully thin reed for a limiting principle.  The more 
conscientious conclusion would be that neither DAPA recipients nor 
the parents of DACA beneficiaries have a practical route available to 
gain legal status.  That would at least be an accurate account of the 
law, although not one that supports DAPA’s legality. 
OLC and other DAPA supporters argue that DAPA does not 
conflict with the INA because the benefits DAPA provides are not 
grants of legal status.343  However, this argument reads Congress’s 
intent far too narrowly.  The intricate latticework of provisions that 
deter unlawful entry and presence, discourage reliance on post-entry 
U.S.-citizen children, and limit unlawful entrants’ access to work are 
                                                           
 336. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 337. OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 29. 
 338. Id. at 32. 
 339. Id. 
 340. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 341. Id. § 1255(a). 
 342. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). 
 343. See OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 13; Legomsky Testimony, supra note 2, at 15. 
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not mere ministerial ex post guides for the allocation of visas.  These 
provisions send a strong ex ante message deterring the underlying 
conduct that produces violations of immigration law.  This ex ante 
focus is not unique to the INA; it is a pervasive feature of positive 
law.344  Alexander Hamilton, for example, observed that judicial 
review of statutes “not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs 
of [statutes] which may have been passed, but . . . operates as a check 
upon the legislative body in passing them, who . . . are . . . compelled . . . 
to qualify their attempts.”345  So, too, with immigration law. 
Moreover, DAPA defenders’ facile distinction between status and 
benefit ignores the behavioral truth that Congress has recognized 
since IRCA:  unlawful immigration is driven not by the allure of 
status, per se, but by the pull of benefits attached to status, including 
the ability to work legally.  Immigration status is a bundle of benefits, 
as well as a formal legal category.  Even without offering legal status, 
DAPA gives its recipients much of what led them to the United States.  
As the House Judiciary Committee said in its report on IIRIRA, jobs 
are the “magnet” for unlawful migration.346  DAPA vindicates the 
magnetic attraction that U.S. employment exerted for DAPA’s 
recipients.  DAPA also provides its recipients with the chance to 
remain in the United States for three years and the prospect for 
renewing relief after that date, as DACA has done.347 
Viewed as an intermediate-term bundle of benefits, DAPA is surely 
the functional equivalent of LPR status.  In the long term, DAPA 
lacks the certainty and path to citizenship that LPR status confers.  
However, as the great economist John Maynard Keynes once wryly 
observed, “[i]n the long run we are all dead.”348  Intermediate effects 
often drive human action, and in the intermediate term, DAPA 
confers many of the benefits of LPR status. 
                                                           
 344. See Darley et al., supra note 30, at 165, 181 (noting that lawmakers believe that 
the essential function of law is to guide conduct but also finding that many ordinary 
citizens do not know specific state laws). 
 345. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 346. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 126 (1996) (explaining how the availability of 
jobs attracts illegal aliens to the detriment of U.S. workers). 
 347. To be sure, DAPA recipients will not obtain all that status has to offer.  For 
example, DAPA recipients will not receive the ability to sponsor close relatives for 
admission to the United States.  However, that ability may not be a relevant factor for 
most DAPA recipients:  by definition, their children are already U.S. citizens, and 
their spouses will also frequently qualify for DAPA as parents of U.S. citizens. 
 348. See ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES:  THE ECONOMIST AS SAVIOUR 
1920–1937 62 (1992). 
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Reading the INA to preclude the unchecked discretion announced 
in DAPA would hardly eliminate executive discretion regarding 
immigration benefits.  It would merely impose an intelligible limiting 
principle on discretion based on the INA’s text, context, and 
implementation.  Discretion regarding benefits would be permissible 
when it is expressly authorized by Congress, ancillary to a statutory 
grant of legal status, hardship-based, or triggered by exigencies 
abroad.  That list is faithful to the framework of immigration law and 
to past practice.  More expansive awards of immigration benefits 
should await a clear statement from Congress. 
Immigration officials have also argued that the limiting principle 
governing DAPA relates to the resources that Congress has 
appropriated for the investigation, detention, and removal of 
undocumented persons.349  However, OLC’s legal and factual support 
for this argument is meager.  Congress has budgeted over $5.2 billion 
for immigration enforcement.350  While OLC claimed that Congress 
had set priorities for the removal of noncitizens convicted of a crime 
that precluded removal of most other noncitizens subject to 
removal,351 OLC’s math is questionable.  Congress required federal 
officials to devote $1.6 billion to the identification of noncitizens who 
had committed crimes and may be subject to removal.352  However, 
that leaves $3.6 billion available for other immigration enforcement.  
Perhaps, as in its classification of the roughly 4 million people 
potentially granted benefits under DAPA as “only a fraction” of the 
total of 11 million undocumented people in the United States,353 
OLC would claim that $3.6 billion is “only a fraction” of $5.2 billion.  
That is literally true, but $3.6 billion is quite a large fraction.  Of 
course, as OLC asserted, immigration officials do not have the 
budgetary resources to remove all undocumented individuals in the 
United States.354  However, that assertion proves too much.  Budgets 
constrain enforcement in virtually every area of law enforcement, civil 
and criminal.  That does require governments to set priorities.  
However, it does not require the wholesale grant of benefits, such as 
work authorization or a formal reprieve from removal.  In other 
settings, including criminal law, environmental law, and food and 
                                                           
 349. See OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 10. 
 350. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F, tit. II, 
128 Stat. 5, 250 (containing the DHS Appropriations Act). 
 351. OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 10. 
 352. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 128 Stat. at 251. 
 353. OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 31. 
 354. Id. at 10. 
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drug safety, government resources shape priorities.  However, 
government does not award those who violate the law in any of these 
areas a license to continue to benefit from their violations or to reap 
additional benefits.  Therefore, courts should read the INA as 
precluding the blanket grant of benefits that DAPA embodies. 
DAPA’s merits as policy are another matter.  As policy, DAPA is too 
modest because it does not include a pathway to LPR status or 
citizenship.  Executive branch officials framed DAPA as they did 
because they acknowledged that only Congress could provide legal 
status.355  Those officials should have taken to heart President 
Obama’s earlier, on-target judgment that the relief included in DAPA 
properly belongs in Congress’s court.356 
Making immigration reform Congress’s responsibility promotes the 
Framers’ scheme.  As demographic changes transform the electorate 
by making it more diverse, Congress should be obliged to face voters 
squarely, rather than relying on the President to do its work.  
Moreover, voters should recognize the stakes of continuing to elect 
members of Congress who fail to address the pressing need for 
immigration reform.  That realization might well create a more 
favorable legislative landscape for change. 
In addition, immigration advocates should recognize that heaping 
discretion on the Executive Branch is a Faustian bargain.  The 
Executive Branch has often exercised discretion that disadvantaged 
immigrants.357  It will do so again.  Immigration advocates may believe 
that courts will find a ratchet in executive discretion that frees it to 
help noncitizens but stops it from hurting them.  That ratchet is a 
product of wishful thinking.  OLC signaled the ratchet’s absence 
when it cited to United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,358 which 
upheld indefinite detention on flimsy grounds during the McCarthy 
Era.359  Advocates and all devotees of our constitutional order would 
do well to remember that executive discretion that appears 
benevolent today can take on a decidedly different cast as the White 
                                                           
 355. Id. at 2. 
 356. See Catherine Rampell, Whose Job Is it Anyway?, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2014, at A19. 
 357. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544, 546 (1950) 
(upholding the Executive Branch’s indefinite detention based on secret evidence 
alleging a security risk from the Holocaust refugee spouse of an ex-GI); Peter J. 
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1984) 
(discussing judicial deference to executive action in Cold War cases). 
 358. 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
 359. See OLC Opinion, supra note 2, at 4 (noting the congressional understanding 
of immigration policy as flexible and adaptable and emphasizing the Secretary of 
Homeland Security’s broad authority to establish such regulations). 
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House’s occupant changes.  Perhaps advocates believe that from here 
to eternity, a benevolent occupant will preside over the federal 
government.  The Framers’ conviction was otherwise.  Their design 
wisely hedged against the risk of leaders’ venality and arrogance.  
Preserving the Framers’ architecture is more important than any 
policy benefit, no matter how overdue the policy. 
V. DAPA COMES TO YOUNGSTOWN 
The OLC opinion, although it deals mainly with DAPA’s 
reviewability and validity in immigration law, also gestures toward 
broader constitutional issues involving the separation of powers.360  
The guiding text is Justice Jackson’s canonical opinion in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.361  Justice Jackson famously divided 
presidential actions into three categories based on the degree of 
collaboration between the President and Congress.362  The extent of 
collaboration determines the deference that a court will accord to 
presidential action.  The President receives greatest deference for 
acts consistent with Congress’s will, some deference for acts that 
occur when Congress is silent, and little or no deference for acts that 
clash with legislative intent.363 
DAPA, for reasons described above, cannot fit in Justice Jackson’s 
first category, predicated on congressional consent.  The INA is 
comprehensive legislation, analogous to the labor-management 
legislation the Court cited in Youngstown.364  DAPA clashes with INA 
provisions deterring reliance on post-entry U.S.-citizen children, 
unlawful presence, and work by foreign nationals who lack a 
                                                           
 360. This Part borrows from earlier work analyzing DACA.  See Margulies, Taking 
Care of Immigration Law, supra note 77. 
 361. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); Joseph Landau, 
Chevron Meets Youngstown:  National Security and the Administrative State, 92 B.U. L. 
REV. 1917, 1924–25 (2012); cf. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II:  
Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2545558 (arguing that, in light of Youngstown, DAPA 
violates separation of powers). 
 362. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. at 586; see Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On:  The Obama 
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care 
Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 783–84, 829 (2013) (arguing that DACA failed the 
Youngstown test and that President Obama therefore violated the Constitution’s 
Take Care Clause). 
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colorable claim to a legal status and fail to meet one of the other 
bases for exercising discretion to award immigration benefits.365 
DAPA fares no better under Youngstown’s second category, which 
centers on established executive practices in which Congress has long 
acquiesced.366  This category includes the executive practice of 
settling claims with foreign nations367 and protecting federal 
lands.368  As this Article demonstrates, Congress has acknowledged 
and acquiesced in limited, case-by-case grants of immigration 
benefits for individuals, like DAPA recipients, without a reasonable 
path to a legal status.  However, officials have based those grants of 
benefits on compelling individual hardship or exigent circumstances 
abroad.  Congress has never acquiesced in a program approaching 
DAPA’s sweep and scope.  That gap between DAPA and past 
practice undermines any claim that DAPA fits under Youngstown’s 
second category. 
Tellingly, OLC has not even undertaken to justify DAPA under 
Youngstown’s third category, which deals with the President’s 
inherent power.369  That reticence was well-founded.  Because the 
                                                           
 365. The other bases are special hardship and risk based on foreign crises.  See 
supra notes 335–36 and accompanying text. 
 366. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 
682, 684 (1981) (discerning congressional acquiescence in executive claims 
settlements with other nations); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (discussing legislative acquiescence as triggering judicial deference); 
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915) (holding that Congress 
had acquiesced in the Executive Branch’s protection of federal land for orderly 
development); cf. WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 
AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 121–29 (1994) (explaining what authors call 
“customary national security law”); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 
54–68 (1990) (discussing elements, such as numerosity and consistency, that should 
inform analysis of the ongoing interaction between Congress and the President); 
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 415 (2012) (noting that when doctrines such as standing 
restrain judicial review, “interactions between the political branches will, as a 
practical matter, determine the separation of powers”). 
 367. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 682, 684. 
 368. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. at 469. 
 369. For an analysis of Jackson’s third category, see generally David J. Barron & 
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, 
Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008).  For debate on the 
presidential power to refuse to enforce laws, compare Kate Andrias, The President’s 
Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1117–19 (2013) (arguing that prosecutorial 
discretion in DACA was supported by reasonable enforcement priorities and public 
disclosure), with Blackman, supra note 361 (same), and Zachary S. Price, Enforcement 
Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 674–75 (2014) (rejecting a broad 
view of presidential power not to enforce).  See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential 
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President’s constitutional power over immigration is limited, it fails 
to supply the support needed for DAPA’s blanket grant of benefits.  
The Constitution does not mention immigration specifically.370  
However, where it mentions issues related to immigration, it grants 
power to Congress over such matters.  For example, the Framers in 
the Migration and Importation Clause authorized Congress to 
regulate the slave trade in 1808.371  The Constitution also grants 
Congress the power to establish rules for naturalization.372  Finally, 
Congress may regulate interstate commerce and commerce with 
foreign nations.373  If these powers imply a broader power over 
immigration, that power resides in Congress.374 
The Constitution grants the President no enumerated powers over 
immigration.  The closest power is the power to receive ambassadors, 
which implies sway over U.S. diplomatic efforts.375  However, this 
power does not underwrite DAPA’s wholesale award of benefits.  The 
President has authority to defer deportation to deal with foreign 
crises, but DAPA does not implicate that power. 
Advocates for presidential authority might argue that dicta in 
Supreme Court decisions support a more robust conception of 
presidential power.  However, as in the language on executive 
                                                           
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (arguing that the modern structure of 
U.S. governance requires according substantial discretion to the President). 
 370. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 
581, 602 (1889) (inferring basis for Congress’s plenary power over immigration).  
For histories of the plenary power doctrine, see DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION 
NATION:  OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 113–16 (2007); Linda S. Bosniak, 
Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 
1059–60 (1994); Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity:  
Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of Plenary Power 
Versus Aliens’ Rights, 41 VILL. L. REV. 725, 730–31 (1996); Ediberto Roman & Theron 
Simmons, Membership Denied:  Subordination and Subjugation Under United States 
Expansionism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437, 441 (2002) (critiquing judicial deference to 
Congress in governance of territories).  See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS 
TO THE CONSTITUTION:  IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) 
(analyzing the consequences of territoriality under the Constitution). 
 371. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
 372. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 373. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 374. If power over immigration is an incident of sovereignty itself, the President 
may claim a stronger interest.  Cf. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty:  
Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002) (tracing this argument from its origins).  However, 
a sovereignty-based argument that favors the President still must explain the contrary 
inferences from the Constitution’s text. 
 375. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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discretion in Supreme Court cases like AADC and Arizona, dicta can 
easily lead to dead ends.376  For example, in Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States,377 the Court upheld a law that permitted Chinese laborers to 
stay in the country only if they submitted a statement by a “credible 
white witness” that they met the statutory criteria.378  In upholding 
the statute, the Court asserted that in extradition cases the 
President could act unilaterally.379  However, this assertion occurred 
within a larger discussion recognizing that the President’s power 
over immigration was a function of congressional delegation.  The 
Court noted that a statutory delegation to the executive was “the 
more common method.”380  Knauff also contained dicta asserting an 
executive prerogative over immigration.381  However, that case also 
involved discretion expressly delegated by Congress regarding the 
immigration ramifications of national security emergencies.382  In 
short, the dicta supporters cite in favor of presidential power over 
immigration should be read modestly here, as in more recent cases 
dealing with executive discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Statutes, like facts, are stubborn things.  It would make for better 
policy if the INA encompassed the vast, unbridled discretion that 
DAPA asserts.  For better or worse, however, that is not the law that 
Congress wrote.  The INA is a comprehensive framework that both 
enables legal immigration and deters unlawful migration.  To 
accomplish the latter, its provisions discourage unlawful entry, 
presence, and work, while its enumerated categories of legal status 
block unlawful entrants’ acquisition of status through post-entry 
U.S.-citizen children.  The limits on legal status should be read 
broadly, not merely as mechanical formulas for the award of visas, 
but as guideposts for executive discretion. 
Indeed, Congress for over a quarter-century has sought to limit 
discretion in the Executive Branch that undermines the INA’s 
                                                           
 376. See supra notes 198–215 and accompanying text. 
 377. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 378. Id. at 742. 
 379. Id. at 714. 
 380. Id. 
 381. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542–43 (1950). 
 382. Id. at 539–42 (rejecting the petitioner’s argument that a statute enacted 
during World War II that gave the Executive Branch power to exclude foreign 
nationals whose entry would be “prejudicial to the interests of the United States” was 
an unconstitutional delegation of power). 
MARGULIES (DO NOT DELETE) 5/23/2015  1:56 PM 
1256 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1183 
deterrence goals.  In curbing parole, extended voluntary departure, 
temporary protected status, and cancellation of removal, Congress 
has signaled that immigration officials should be sparing in 
administrative awards of benefits, such as work authorization, to 
categories of unlawful entrants without a reasonable prospect of 
obtaining a legal status.  Since DAPA grants benefits to just such a 
group, it is inconsistent with the INA’s comprehensive framework. 
Judicial review of DAPA is appropriate to restore the 
immigration framework’s balance.  The first step would be to 
require that DAPA, as a legislative rule, go through the notice-and-
comment process.  That process alone might provide some of the 
deliberation that DAPA lacks. 
In addition, DAPA is substantively reviewable because its broad 
criteria make it a “statement of general enforcement policy.”383  
Such general policies fall within the presumption of reviewability of 
agency action.  Courts can apply manageable standards to assess 
whether the policy embodied in DAPA comports with the INA.  Of 
course, some residue of discretion remains in individual decisions 
implementing DAPA.  As the Supreme Court indicated in Chaney, 
judicial review of those individual decisions would disrupt the 
statutory scheme.384  However, review of DAPA’s broad policy 
contours merely ensures the policy’s consistency with statutory 
commands that are well-suited to judicial interpretation.  Moreover, 
because of DAPA’s sweeping grant of benefits, it may actually 
constitute agency action, which is presumptively reviewable. 
Upon review, DAPA is unworthy of judicial deference.  The INA’s 
intricate latticework of deterrence is manifestly incompatible with 
the sweeping discretion that DAPA displays.  DAPA defies the INA’s 
deterrence goals.  Instead of limiting moral hazard, as Congress has 
sought to do, DAPA compounds the problem.  Moreover, DAPA 
fails the “common sense” test the Supreme Court outlined in Brown 
& Williamson.385  Given Congress’s focus on deterring unlawful entry 
and presence, it seems implausible that Congress would have 
authorized the sweeping discretion that DAPA entails.  The 
discretion that Congress delegated to immigration officials must 
have a limiting principle.  Limiting discretion over benefits to relief 
that is a bridge to a legal status, a help for extreme hardship, or a 
                                                           
 383. Crowley Caribbean Transp., Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985)). 
 384. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 837–38. 
 385. 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000). 
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shield against exigencies abroad fits the bill.  DAPA’s award of 
benefits to unlawful entrants with no reasonable prospects of 
obtaining a legal status is a bridge too far. 
Admittedly, respecting the INA’s limits will not fix the substantial 
immigration problem that the United States faces.  Comprehensive 
immigration reform is necessary to begin addressing that issue.  
However, understanding why DAPA exceeds statutory authority at 
least clarifies the issues, and puts the issue of immigration reform 
back where it belongs:  in Congress. 
